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EDITORIAL

The Government's decision to reply to the German note on Reparations has the support of all in this country to whom the ideals of Christendom are dear. The cruelties and injustices of the French in the Ruhr have bitten deep into the consciences of English Churchmen; and the Pope's letter to Cardinal Gasparri, summarized in *The Times* of June 27, with its welcome call to renounce the spirit of revenge and the appeal to force, indicates that the conscience of Christian Europe is equally stirred. There is no doubt that the present state of Europe has turned men's minds afresh to the problem of the principles and limits of nationalism; and has made many feel that the League of Nations, useful instrument as it has been and will be, will remain something of a skeleton organization until it is clothed with flesh and blood by a re-united Church. We do not think that this would be furthered by the admission of the Papacy as a constituent State to the League. The true relation of the Church to international politics seems to us rather to be indicated in a note which we publish below in Miscellanea.

Professor Whitney has done a service of great value in the compilation of a *Bibliography of Church History* (S.P.C.K., 1s. net), and we venture to commend it to our readers. The arrangement is by historical periods, with subdivisions for special subjects within each; and the brief criticisms of several of the volumes mentioned are most illuminating. No priest should be without this little handbook to study.

THE CHRISTOLOGY OF PROFESSOR MACKINTOSH

Professor H. R. Mackintosh is the founder of a school of Christology, the influence of which has now spread far beyond the country of its origin. His great work, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, published originally in 1912, has received a warm welcome in English Nonconformist circles. Through the Student Christian Movement (for which he has written two smaller works on similar lines), his views have become widely known among the younger members of English universities and colleges. Modernists and Unitarians have praised his book as the most powerful presentment of something approaching the orthodox position which has appeared for many years past. More significant still, Canon Storr, the Christologian of the recently published volume of essays, *Liberal Evangelicalism* (1923), has declared himself a whole-hearted supporter of Dr. Mackintosh, whose views seem also to be favoured by another contributor, Dean Burroughs.*

Hitherto, Dr. Mackintosh's position has seldom been directly challenged or, indeed, seriously criticized, even in those circles which are regarded as especially orthodox. For this there are several reasons. In the first place, he writes avowedly as a Christian apologist, with the definite aim of establishing Christ's essential deity against current forms of Unitarian and Pantheistic denial.

He challenges Modernism by maintaining that the Incarnation is an undoubted miracle, and as such a sufficient guarantee of the truth of the accompanying miracles in general, and in particular of Christ's Bodily Resurrection and Virginal Conception. Again, his devotional attitude towards our Lord's person leaves nothing to be desired from the standpoint of traditional orthodoxy. Finally, although he rejects with decision the doctrine of the Two Natures of Christ, as defined by the Fourth Œcumenical Council, and that of the Two Wills, as defined by the Sixth, he asserts that his position is, nevertheless, substantially orthodox. He claims that it preserves the full spiritual and devotional (and even dogmatic) value which the Fathers of Chalcedon and Constantinople III. sought to safeguard by their famous definitions, and that it has the further great advantage of being both intelligible and acceptable to the modern mind.

* "The rapid advance of the science of psychology . . . has made many feel that the definition of Christ's Person framed in 451 A.D. by the Council of Chalcedon requires revision" (*o.c.*, p. 102).

This claim seems to the present writer to some extent a true one. There can be little doubt that many Christians inclined to extreme Liberal views have been helped by this book to realize how strong a case can be made out for something not far removed from the traditional estimate of Christ's person, and that the wide dissemination of this and other writings of Dr. Mackintosh among members of the Student Christian Movement has had a useful effect in counteracting the vaguer and more unsettling teaching of the school of Dr. Glover.

Upon the whole, Dr. Mackintosh's treatise is fairly and charitably written; nevertheless, there runs through it an unmistakable note of challenge not only to Catholic Christianity, but even to Orthodox Protestantism. In one place he actually allows himself to say: "To return . . . to a theoretic duality of mental life in our Lord, against which all modern Christology has been a protest, is surely to *sin against light.*"*

Since, however, the decisions of Chalcedon and Constantinople III., which he contests, have been accepted with practical unanimity by all Christians up to the Reformation, and were not challenged by any of the Reformation leaders except Socinus, and are still regarded as essential to right belief in the Incarnation by the immense majority of Christians both Catholic and Protestant, I venture, even at the risk of "sinning against light," to point out what seem to me certain defects in Dr. Mackintosh's treatment of his subject, and to plead, at the very least, for suspension of judgment upon the points at issue.

In the abstract, no doubt, much is to be said for Dr. Mackintosh's proposal to restate the doctrine of the Incarnation in terms of modern thought—*i.e.*, of the categories usually employed by modern metaphysicians and psychologists. But in the concrete, the difficulties which arise when we attempt the task are enormous, and (as it seems to me) insuperable. At the time when the Catholic creeds were drawn up, and the official theology of the Church was formulated, there was (practically speaking) one single accepted system of doctrine and terminology, both in metaphysics and in psychology. To-day there is nothing of the kind. Modern metaphysics is, unfortunately, little more than a welter of inconsistent and antagonistic systems;† and as for modern psychology, the briefest description of its different schools and their principal subdivisions would occupy at least a page.‡ Whichever system

* p. 482, italics mine.

† Mr. Thomas Case hardly exaggerates, when he speaks of "the *anarchy* of modern metaphysics" (E. B., 1911, article "Metaphysics").

‡ The differences between the chief psychological schools turn far more upon fundamentals than upon details. Thus it is vehemently disputed whether psychology is a philosophical or a purely natural science; whether its subject-matter is

we select as the basis of our theological reconstruction, we necessarily antagonize all the other systems which we thereby reject. On the other hand, if we decide to retain the somewhat archaic but perfectly clear and consistent terminology of the ancient creeds and councils, we avoid taking sides in the acrimonious disputes of the modern schools, and escape many other practical difficulties.

With regard to psychology, even if the modern science really were (what it certainly is not) a coherent system, it might still be reasonably doubted whether its categories could be successfully applied, without extensive change, to the special case of the God-man. The unique as such is beyond the boundaries of science, and fits into none of its categories. The categories of modern psychology have been deliberately framed with the object of describing with all possible precision the mentality of *the average or normal man*. To expect them to describe accurately or exhaustively the mentality of one who was *ex hypothesi* God manifest in the flesh, is surely unreasonable. This consideration Dr. Mackintosh unfortunately ignores. He argues repeatedly that since Jesus was true man, and since His Godhead was probably mediated and revealed entirely through His manhood, therefore His mentality is capable of accurate description in the categories of modern psychology. In particular, he urges that since the normal man has only one "mode" (or "centre") of consciousness, therefore Jesus cannot have had more, and that therefore the doctrine of the Two Natures, promulgated at Chalcedon, is false.*

Dr. Mackintosh, however, somewhat grudgingly† admits that the man Jesus (at least in moments of exaltation) was conscious of being the Son of God in a unique sense, and further that in this character He forgave sins, and declared Himself to be the future judge of the world: "Jesus was habitually conscious that in His Person divine power had entered the world for the accomplishment of all that can be called salvation. He was the Chosen One, by whose presence evil was already overcome in principle; the predicted deliverer who should save many by

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mental activity or mere external "behaviour"; whether the "soul" or "psyche," as distinguished from its changing activities, has any real existence; whether mental activity is a form of "energy"; whether mentation is physiologically or psychically determined; whether there is any interaction between mind and body; and whether reason (or reasoning) has any influence upon belief and conduct. Even the Freudians are divided into at least two antagonistic groups: the school of Vienna and that of Switzerland.

* Similarly Canon Storr writes: "A normally constituted person is an organic whole with a single centre of consciousness and a single will . . . Jesus was a human being like ourselves. . . . He had not two volitional centres or centres of consciousness" (*o.c.*, pp. 103, 108.)

† "It can only have been in mature manhood, and perhaps intermittently, that Christ became aware of His divinity" (p. 481).

His death; the victor who should conquer the last enemy by rising from the grave, and, in due time, appear in glory as the judge of all mankind." He even speaks of "the uniqueness of Jesus for His own consciousness"—a uniqueness shown especially in this, that He "knows no more sacred task than to point men to His own Person."*

It seems to me that in thus conceding the "uniqueness" of the consciousness of Jesus, Dr. Mackintosh forfeits all right to invoke the authority of modern psychology (which is confessedly a psychology of the *normal*) against the doctrine of the Two Natures. This is candidly admitted by not a few of the more advanced liberal supporters of Dr. Mackintosh's general position, who proclaim openly that their principles require them to deny that the consciousness of Jesus was "unique." They contend (quite reasonably from their own standpoint) that though the historic Jesus really was the Son of God made man, He was quite unaware of the fact, and that the Synoptic statements to the contrary are untrustworthy.

In thus removing the logical contradiction involved in Dr. Mackintosh's statement of the case, they entangle themselves in a contradiction of historic fact, which nothing but special pleading can remove, for clearly the Gospels—even the Synoptics—represent Jesus as having been conscious (at least from the date of His baptism) of being the unique Son of God, the object of saving faith, the propitiation for human sin, and the future judge of the world.†

Objection may also be raised against Dr. Mackintosh's unqualified statement that "all modern Christology" rejects the doctrine of the Two Natures. This is certainly not true of Catholic Christology, even of the more liberal type (such as that of the *Lux Mundi* School, or of Du Bose, or Relton), nor is it true on the whole even of the Christology of Protestantism, which, at any rate in Great Britain and America, still conforms very largely to the traditional standard.

It is, however, true of the Christology of Continental Protestantism. In Germany, in particular, the doctrine of the Two Natures has been abandoned for more than two generations by practically all who have the right to speak in the name of Protestantism. As far back as 1913, Professor F. Loofs was able to say: "There is hardly a learned theologian—I know of none in Germany—who defends orthodox Christology in its unaltered form."‡

* Pp. 33, 34. *Cf.*, p. 481: "At least in high moments of visitation, He knew Himself the Son conditioned by and in humanity."

† Dr. Rashdall, in order to maintain his thesis that the consciousness of Jesus was of a purely human kind, is obliged to have recourse to the desperate expedient of denying that He ever at any time called Himself the Son of God, or the Son of man, or the future Judge of mankind.

‡ *What is the truth about Jesus Christ?* (p. 184).

Dr. Mackintosh, however, omits to inform us that during the same period there has been a steady (and since 1900 even a rapid) drift towards Unitarianism—so much so, that it would be difficult to find, at the present moment, in the whole of Germany a single Protestant theologian of repute as nearly orthodox as himself. Continental Protestantism tends more and more to take up the position, that if Jesus had only one nature, then that nature was human nature, because, while His deity is a matter of uncertain inference, His humanity is an incontrovertible fact. If, therefore, orthodox Christians "sin against light" in refusing to follow Continental Protestantism in its denial of Christ's Two Natures, does not Dr. Mackintosh himself equally "sin against light" in refusing to follow it in its denial of Christ's Godhead?

The fact is that the extremely warm welcome accorded to Dr. Mackintosh's book in England by advanced Modernist and Unitarian critics is due far less to its intrinsic merits, than to a confident and probably well-grounded anticipation on their part, that the denial of the Two Natures, which he advocates, will tend to produce the same effect in England which it has already produced in Germany—*viz.*, a reduced and naturalistic Christology, approximating ever more and more closely to Unitarianism, or, at least, Pantheistic Modernism.

Dr. Mackintosh's system of Christology is based upon three fundamental principles, which may be briefly stated as follows:

1. That the category of substance has been definitely rejected by modern thinkers; and that therefore the relation of Christ to God ought to be expressed no longer in terms of "substance," but in terms of "personality"—*i.e.*, of "will."

2. That the doctrines of the Two Natures and Two Wills of Christ conflict both with modern psychology and with the Gospel evidence, and should therefore be abandoned.

3. That the Incarnation of God in Christ may be correctly stated in terms of "immanence."

I.

The fundamental reply to the proposal to substitute the category of "personality" for that of "substance," is that it is impossible to define (or even think) of "personality" without introducing the idea of "substance." This is the opinion, not only of the friends of tradition, but also of so modern-minded a philosopher as Professor C. C. J. Webb, who states expressly that the traditional definition of "person" ("a person is an individual *substance* of a rational nature"), attributed to Boethius (A.D. 480-524), is still the best that we have.*

* *God and Personality*, 1918, p. 47.

Dr. Mackintosh, on the contrary, contends that it is possible to define personality in terms of *mental activity alone*, and particularly in terms of *will*, which in his view is the real constitutive element in personality. "If we are inspired by the Christian faith to affirm that Jesus Christ is identical with God in will—a will manifested in His achievement—we have reached a point beyond which no advance is possible. . . . Intelligent will is the organic centre of personality."*

It seems, however, most difficult—in fact impossible—to imagine an "activity" which is not an activity of *something*. Just as there can be no movement which is not the movement of *something*, so there can be no mental act (whether willing, or desiring, or feeling, or knowing, or thinking) which is not the act of some personal agent or "self." Volitions and feelings and thoughts are always activities of a "self," and this "self," which is relatively permanent, and preserves its identity through many years of development and growth, is quite as much an object of direct experience as are those mental activities to which Dr. Mackintosh proposes to reduce it. There is really no such thing as "will" apart from a "self"—*i.e.*, apart from a "substance," for self is substance. The standard definition of substance is "that which exists *per se*"—*i.e.*, in its own right, and not as a mere attribute or activity of something else. An "attribute" or "activity," on the other hand, is that which exists, not in its own right, but as inhering in some other thing or substance.

Now, clearly the "self" conforms to the definition of "substance," and "will" to the definition of "activity," for it is the "self" that wills. Accordingly, it is strictly *impossible* to follow Dr. Mackintosh in defining personality in terms of "will." "Will" is an "activity"—an activity of some "self" or spiritual substance. Consequently a "person" is not, as Dr. Mackintosh alleges, a "will," but rather *a self that wills* (and, of course, exercises other spiritual activities).

What has been already said is sufficient to show how fundamentally mistaken is the school of Dr. Mackintosh in regarding "substance" as "a physical and partly mechanical conception."† The truth is that our knowledge of "substance" is derived, not primarily from matter at all, but from our first-

* P. 304. *Cf.* Dr. Temple's words in *Foundations* (p. 247): "Let us take first the Divinity of Christ, and try to interpret it, not in terms of Substance, but of Spirit—that is of Will . . . We shall not distinguish between Will and Substance. For after all, Will is the only Substance there is in a man; it is not part of him, it is just himself as a moral (or indeed 'active') being."

† *Cf. Foundations:* "The 'substance' of the Greek Fathers, whether divine or human, . . . is, in fact, an intangible matter" (p. 231).

hand knowledge of our permanent "selves" or "egos," which are immediately discerned as possessing the properties of spirit, not of matter. Indeed, many eminent philosophers (including Berkeley), who deny the existence of "material substance" altogether, admit the existence of "spiritual substances" —*viz.*, God, angels, and human souls.*

Equally mistaken is the confident assertion that the category of "substance" is a "static" one, excluding development or growth. On the contrary, the only "substance" intimately known to us—*viz.*, our own individual "self," grows and develops continuously from infancy to old age, while yet it preserves, entirely unchanged, its mysterious "personal identity."

That certain modern philosophers and psychologists profess to discard the category of "substance" (more often in appearance than reality), and that in certain quarters "souls have gone out of fashion," is true enough; but that there has been any universal, or even general, abandonment of belief in "substance" by modern thinkers cannot be fairly asserted. "However much assailed or disowned," writes Professor James Ward, "the concept of a 'mind' or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers whatever, not more in Berkeley who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume who treats it as a fiction." His judgment on the modern attempt, favoured by Dr. Mackintosh, to reduce the "self" to its own activities is most severe. "Paradox," he says, "is too mild a word for it; even contradiction will hardly suffice."†

One of the ablest and most widely circulated treatises on psychology published in recent years, Dr. William McDougall's *Body and Mind*, is from cover to cover a defence of the substantiality of the soul, and a *reductio ad absurdum* of the "psychology without a soul" which has achieved a certain popularity of late. Not only Lotze, who writes, "A mere sensation without a subject [*i.e.* 'self'] is nowhere to be met with as a fact,"‡ but even such extremely sceptical philosophers as Mr. McTaggart and Mr. Bertrand Russell admit that the soul is a substance, distinct from its activities.

The present philosophical situation is well summed up by Dr. James Lindsay: "There have been many attempts in modern philosophy to interpret experience intelligibly without

* The fallacy of arguing that the category of "substance" is material or materialistic, because it is applicable to matter, will be immediately perceived, if we remember that the similar category of "being" or "existence" is applicable equally to God, to human souls, and to matter. We say that God exists, human souls exist, matter exists, *in an identical sense*.

† E. B., 11th edition, art. "Psychology." ‡ *Metaphysics*, E. T., Bk. iii., ch. 1.

the aid of the category of substance; but even when it has been denied in words, it has not been possible to deny it in thought . . . . Substance must be sought . . . in the 'self,' which attests itself as a substantial being behind all its activities. . . . [The] knowing subject is itself substance. . . . The notion of substance is one from which we simply cannot get away."

II

With regard to the doctrine of the Two Natures and the Two Wills, there is really nothing in the Gospels that makes against it, and very much that favours it. The consciousness of Jesus, as depicted even by the Synoptists, though *truly* human, is very far from being *purely* human. The formula "Jesus was a human being just like ourselves" can only be made to harmonize with the Gospels by a policy of drastic expurgation of the text. It is nothing less than an abuse of language to speak of the consciousness of one who knew Himself to be the Son of God in a sense which exalted Him far above, not merely the inhabitants of earth, but even the hosts of heaven;* who regarded Himself as the future judge of quick and dead;† who taught that His essential nature could be comprehended by the Father only, and was, therefore, infinite;‡ who pointed to Himself as the object of saving faith, and the only effectual means of access to God;§ who, by His own inherent authority, forgave sins, revised the ancient law, and declared His word immutable;‖ who rebuked the winds and waves as the rightful Lord of Nature;¶ and who regarded His death as a propitiation for human sin,** and the inauguration of a new covenant of reconciliation between God and man,†† as a *purely human* consciousness. Clearly it was a *divine-human* consciousness, and the logic of the situation requires us further to hold that the divine and the human factors in it, though so closely related, and in fact inseparable, were nevertheless in some measure *distinct*. For if they were not distinct, we are driven to one of two entirely unacceptable conclusions, (1) either that Jesus was neither God nor man, but a *tertium quid*—a kind of amalgam of both; (2) or else that the pantheists are right, and there is no real distinction, but rather full identity, between human nature and deity. We conclude, therefore, that the Gospel evidence, interpreted in the light of the usual Christian presuppositions concerning the relations obtaining between

* Mk. xiii. 32. † Mt. xxv. 31-46, etc. ‡ Mt. xi. 27. § Mt. xi. 25-30.
‖ Mk. ii. 10; Mt. v. 27, 32, 34, 39, 44; Mk. xiii. 31.
¶ His words imply *absolute supremacy* ("Peace, *be muzzled*," Mk. iv. 39).
** Mk. x. 45; Mt. xxvi. 28. †† Mk. xiv. 24; Lk. xxii. 20.

the divine and human natures, necessitates the adoption of the two-nature hypothesis in some form or other.

With regard to the doctrine of the Two Wills, which is obviously a corollary of the doctrine of the Two Natures, there is no foundation whatever for the frequent assertion that it is lacking in scriptural support. According to Synoptic, as well as Johannine, teaching, Jesus was endowed with a human will, which, though in the end always conforming itself to the Divine will, yet did so at times at the cost of a severe inward struggle. Thus, in the Agony in the Garden, Jesus prays (Luke xxii. 42): "Father, if Thou be willing, remove this cup from Me; nevertheless, not My will (*θέλημα*), but Thine be done" (see also John v. 30 and vi. 38).

The same conclusion, that Jesus possessed two natures and two wills, results if we consider the question from the philosophic standpoint. If the Incarnation means "God becoming man," as Dr. Mackintosh admits, then it is clear that God, in order to become man, must have *limited* (in the sphere of the Incarnation) the exercise of certain of His infinite attributes, notably His omniscience, omnipotence, and impassibility. He cannot have abandoned them altogether, otherwise He would have practically ceased to be God, and the universe would have fallen into confusion, and, indeed, been annihilated, for clearly the power and wisdom of the human Jesus were insufficient to sustain it. But if God, at the Incarnation, acquired a finite mode of consciousness, without abandoning His infinite mode, then He must have become possessed of two distinct natures.

Nor do we reach a different conclusion, if we adopt the Trinitarian hypothesis (upon which Dr. Mackintosh, however, lays little stress), and regard the Incarnation as meaning that the *Son of God*—the second Person of the Trinity—became man. For if the Son of God is really God, and as such is the Father's agent in the creation and sustaining of the universe (which is the scriptural account of His relation to things created, John i. 3, 10; Col. i. 16-17, etc.), then it involves nothing less than *a revolution in the Godhead*, for which there is no scriptural authority, to suppose that these cosmic functions were abandoned. Moreover, since, on the Trinitarian hypothesis, the perfect love of God is constituted in large measure by the mutual love of the Father and the Son, it follows, if at the Incarnation the Son was reduced *in every aspect* to the status of a creature, that the Trinity then suffered *moral mutilation*, and God ceased to be perfect love.

It seems to me that we can only avoid these and the like incredible paradoxes by supposing that the Son of God, from

the moment of His Incarnation, subsisted whole and entire in two distinct "modes" of being, one finite, the other infinite —in other words, He possessed two natures.*

III

A thorough philosophic discussion of Dr. Mackintosh's contention (p. 434), that "one true mode of describing Christ . . . . is to speak of His Person as representing the *absolute immanence* of God," would require more space than is here available. I can only state summarily what I have tried to prove elsewhere,† that there can only be "immanence" or "indwelling," when that which indwells, and that which is indwelt, are *distinct* from one another. Thus the soul can be correctly said to be "immanent" in the body, because the soul is *distinct* from the body. But the soul cannot be truly said to be immanent in *itself*, because the relation of a thing to itself is *identity*, not immanence.

To apply this principle to the Incarnation, if God at the Incarnation *became* man (as Dr. Mackintosh admits), then a relation of *identity* was set up, and since identity excludes immanence, the Incarnation cannot correctly be described in terms of Immanence.

It must surely be evident to every unprejudiced mind upon careful reflection that "indwelling," however ideally perfect, can never (if logically interpreted) yield any other idea than that of *a man in whom God abides*, a God-possessed, God-inspired, and God-sanctified man. Never by any possibility can it yield the idea of a man who is actually God. In ancient days the theory of immanence produced Nestorianism and several types of Ebionism. In our age it usually issues in Unitarianism, the adherents of which are entirely satisfied with Dr. Mackintosh's description of Jesus as "the subject of the absolute immanence of God."

My aim in this brief discussion has been less to refute the theories of Dr. Mackintosh (that would require a treatise), than to show that there is another side to the question, and that those who reject his views do so, not because they prefer darkness to light, or are ignorant of recent developments in metaphysics, psychology, and theology, but simply and solely because, having weighed his arguments to the best of their ability, they consider them insufficient. *The Person of Jesus Christ* is a great book, worthy of the best traditions of Scottish

* It follows from that fact that Godhead is Indivisible, that the Son of God was "totally" in both natures—*totus in carne*, and *totus extra carnem*, to use the technical expression.

† At length in *Creeds or no Creeds ?* (1922), and briefly in the Introduction to the 3rd edition to *Pro Fide* (1923).

theology. Its argument against Unitarianism, based on the age-long Christian experience of Redemption from sin, is powerfully urged, and is likely, in my opinion, to leave a permanent mark on Christian apologetics. Nevertheless, I cannot really feel that the author has made out his case against the Christology of the Œcumenical Councils, or offers us anything better to put in its place. The old Christological formulas, whatever their real or fancied shortcomings, did at least achieve what they aimed at, the exclusion of grave theological error. None of Dr. Mackintosh's formulas, whatever their other merits, are likely to have any such efficacy.

Of the three chief formulas which sum up his Christology—*viz.*, (1) that Christ is one with God not in "substance," but in "will," (2) that Christ has only a single nature, (3) that the Incarnation is a kind of Immanence, all three are consistent with Unitarianism. The first would have delighted Arius; the second would have been welcomed by the Monophysites; and the third would have satisfied not only the Nestorians, but also the bulk of the Ebionites.

CHARLES HARRIS.

THE MANAGEMENT OF GLEBE

IT is seldom realized that every penny of the ancient endowments of the Church has its origin either from land or from a charge on land—*i.e.*, glebe and tithe. From the earliest times no church could be consecrated unless "a competent and honourable maintenance" was provided for the parson. In those days land was the sole source from which such maintenance could be secured. As time went on innumerable gifts of land were made to particular benefices so as to ensure a living wage for the incumbent. Then under various Enclosure Acts the parson's common rights were commuted by an allotment of land, and under the Tithe Commutation Act of 1836 many benefices, more especially those in the midland counties, were allotted lands in lieu of tithe. Thus it has come about that the Church to-day, through its corporations sole—*i.e.*, Bishops and parochial clergy—and its corporations aggregate—*i.e.*, cathedral bodies—is by far the largest landowner in the country. Up to one hundred years ago, before England became a great industrial country, the material prosperity of practically all the clergy depended upon the condition of agriculture. If agriculture prospered the clergy prospered, and *vice versa*.

This very close connection between the clergy and the land had advantages which the present generation is apt to overlook.

True, that occasionally there were unseemly disputes on the question of tithe, memories of which still linger in many country parishes, and, more often than not, the tithe payer was more to blame than the tithe owner; but the parson in those days, from the very nature of the case, was bound to know the conditions of life in his parish, the successes and failures of his parishioners (for he shared them) in a way in which it is impossible for him to know them to-day. On the whole, the old system worked well; it was probably the one best suited to the times and conditions under which it operated. The conditions of this twentieth century are entirely different. England is more and more becoming a vast industrial country. The old country parson, spending the whole of his clerical life in the same parish, with his intimate knowledge of land and its management and its proper cultivation and of all that appertains to country life, is to-day wellnigh extinct. Many clergy, more especially in their younger days, avoid the country benefice as they would a plague. The town, with all its life and movement and bustle, attracts them. There they look to do their best work. The peaceful country village, more especially if the benefice provides a living wage, is now regarded as a pleasant and well-earned haven of rest in which the over-tired town priest may find refuge in his declining years after he has borne the burden and heat of the day.

And it is just here that the difficulty arises. As a rule, the endowment of the town parish takes the form of a quarterly or half-yearly cheque from the Ecclesiastical Commissioners or from a source very easy to collect, while that of the country parish arises from glebe, which has to be managed, or from tithe, which has to be collected, or, more usually, from both. And as a general rule, the parson of to-day is altogether and entirely out of his depth when he tries to deal with either the subject of land or that of tithe. On reflection, it is not at all unnatural that this should be the case, for probably not one parson in ten has had the opportunity to make himself master of those subjects even if he had the inclination.

But the fact remains that this lack of knowledge must, in the aggregate, have lost and is still losing the country parsons throughout England an enormous amount of money, and of all classes in the community the average country parson is the one least able to afford to lose any income whatsoever.

Take two instances which have come under the writer's personal observation. A man, after holding a town living for some years, accepts the offer of a small country benefice. The endowment of the benefice is 200 acres of land, most of it allotted to the incumbent in lieu of tithe at the time of the

Tithe Commutation Act, 1836. He finds that the chief man in the village is also his chief tenant, that the rent is very inadequate and has not been revised for years, that the fences of the glebe and other repairs usually falling on the tenant have been neglected. He finds also that his tenant has held the office of churchwarden on behalf of the parish for many years, that one daughter plays the harmonium in church, trains the small village choir, and that another daughter teaches in the Sunday-school. In short, he finds that his tenant is not only the mainstay from whence he has to look for his exiguous official income, but also, with his family, the chief support of the church in this small isolated country village. Not only is the parson's position distinctly difficult, but is it fair that any parson should have to run the risk of finding himself in such a position ?

Take another instance. An incumbent, the endowment of whose benefice arose chiefly from glebe, found himself greatly embarrassed. His chief tenant, who combined the occupations of butcher and farmer, and whose rent had been the same for many years, voluntarily offered a magnificent increase of rent to the extent of half a crown an acre at the very height of the farming and butchering boom during the late war ! This set the good man wondering, and he wisely decided to seek expert advice as to the real rental value of his glebe, with the result that the tenant was quite satisfied to pay 100 per cent. more rent than before. But there was a curious point in this particular case. When the parson met those whom he had called in to advise him, they (and not he) had to show him by means of a map what fields belonged to his benefice and what did not belong. Although he had held the living for close upon twenty years, he had only a hazy idea as to the general direction in which the glebe lay, and he could not, if his life had depended on it, identify any particular field as glebe. One ceases to wonder at absurdly low rents under these conditions.

One could go on to tell of incumbents who employ as their " agents " the local assistant overseer (it is so simple to collect rents and tithe at the same time as the rates), or the man whose sole qualification for the job was that his father and grandfather acted in the same capacity to previous incumbents and it would cause ill-feeling if the tradition were broken. Sometimes the sexton has acted as " agent." In one case an " agent " collected tithe in 1918 on the 1913 averages.

Then, of course, there are those cases to which no possible exception can be taken, where the incumbent entrusts his glebe to the management of a duly qualified land agent.

The result of this mismanagement, or, rather, total lack of management, has been as deplorable as it is obvious. In

addition to needless loss of income, huge sums have been spent on dilapidations, the majority of which would, with proper supervision, never have been allowed to have materialized. Many benefices of small value have been financially crippled through the necessity of raising loans from Queen Anne's Bounty to meet the cost of irrecoverable dilapidations. Rents have been based on an absurdly low basis. The land has been badly farmed, and all the "heart" has been taken out of it. A new tenancy has generally meant a reduced rent, at any rate for a period of years, and, most serious of all, the capital value or selling price of the land has been grievously depreciated.

This state of affairs is mostly due to two causes: (*a*) the natural reluctance of the parson to have business dealings with a parishioner which may impair those friendly relations which ought to exist between parish priest and people; (*b*) the parson's inability from lack of knowledge and experience to properly manage the property of which he has temporary possession and from which he derives his official income.

The obvious remedy is that, if the parson is afraid that his relations with his parishioners may be strained thereby, or if he has not sufficient knowledge to enable him to manage his glebe to the best advantage, there should be set up in every diocese an agency to manage it on his behalf.

Take the first of the two instances given above and try to imagine the position of the incumbent in the event of his trying, by personal negotiation, to obtain a long overdue increase of rent as well as a proper observance of the covenants of the agreement.

He is bound to fail in his endeavour. He knows practically nothing about the subject on which his tenant knows everything. Then it is almost inevitable that the personal element comes in and, as a consequence, he runs the risk of losing the churchwarden, his organist, and Sunday-school teacher. It is a very small parish; no other suitable warden or organist is available. Feeling runs higher in small parishes than it does in large towns. Differences of opinion and of outlook have a greater tendency to develop into personal quarrels. So the poor incumbent has to take his choice between poverty coupled with peace, or an increased rent which will make bad blood between him and his chief parishioner. Too often he is forced to choose the former as the lesser of two evils. It is a cruel and an unfair position, and one which the establishment of a diocesan agency would at once obviate.

In the Diocese of Southwell a glebe agency has been in existence for some time. It is quite an unofficial organization, but it has the advantage of having the Bishop as its patron,

and a great debt of gratitude is due to him for his encouragement and advocacy of the agency. Its rules are few and simple. The relations between incumbent and agent are precisely similar to those existing between any other landowner and his agent. The incumbent is consulted at every step of every negotiation, and he can, if he so desires, absolutely ignore the advice the agent tenders. The work of the agent is to generally supervise the properties entrusted to his charge. He advises members as to rents, tenants, and the condition of the glebe, and the buildings upon it. He acts on their behalf and watches their interests on any change of tenancy. He draws up agreements and sees that the covenants are properly observed, particularly where breaches of the agreement would lead to increased liability for dilapidations—*e.g.*, neglect of fences and so forth. He advises as to the selling and development of glebe. He sees that all assessments to local rates (where his client pays them) and imperial taxes, so far as each concerns the property he manages, are on a proper and legal basis. He collects rents and tithe, and every half-year he sends the incumbent a cheque for the amount due to him after deducting his commission as agent.

In addition to this, every incumbent in the diocese, whether a member of the agency or no, can, for a comparatively small fee, place all his income tax business, private as well as official, in the agent's hands, who sees that the proper deductions are allowed and that no incumbent is over-assessed. This has proved a great boon, and has saved many an incumbent much worry and considerable overpayment.

The agency took full advantage of the great boom in land which reached its height in 1920 and the first half of 1921.

During 1920, forty-four Nottinghamshire incumbents sold, through the agency, no less than 1,341 acres of glebe, the purchase price being £60,134. The total increase of income accruing to the benefices concerned amounted to £1,978 per annum, or, roughly speaking, an average increase of £45 per benefice. (This increase is based on the interest from invested funds being reckoned at 5 per cent.—as a matter of fact, the actual yield works out at slightly over 5½ per cent.) But this is not all. Not only is the increase of income important, equally important is the decrease of liability. No longer will the diocesan surveyor dilapidate on those 1,341 acres, and the parson worry himself almost to death as to where the money is to come from. No longer will he pay tithe and land and drainage tax. There will be no further worry, parochial or financial, with tenants. There is a great fascination in the ownership of land, but in these hard times there is a greater fascination in the regular quarterly cheque from the Ecclesiastical Commissioners.

Details of two of the most profitable transactions carried through during this year may prove of interest as showing what could be accomplished when a fully qualified land agent had charge.

Benefice A.—The endowment of this benefice was derived from glebe originally let for the sum of £446 per annum.

Part of the glebe was sold, and the remaining portion was let at an increased rental.

Revised rent of land unsold, £209 per annum.

Purchase price of land sold by auction, after deduction of expenses of sale, £9,040. £9,040 invested at 5 per cent.=£452.

The present income of the benefice is, therefore, £661, as compared with £446, or an increase of £215 per annum. It must further be borne in mind that the benefice is freed from all dilapidations as well as from a land tax of £7 per annum on that portion of the glebe which was sold.

Benefice B.—149 acres, which were let with other lands, comprising 181 acres in all, at an annual rental of £280, were sold for £7,475. By this sale the incumbent was relieved of tithe rent charge commuted at £7 15s., land tax amounting to £3 11s., and repairs to an old and large farmhouse, cottages, and extensive outbuildings. A further 14 acres, including a pair of cottages and producing a gross annual income of £29 7s., were sold for £1,241.

In other words, the value of this benefice has been permanently increased to the extent of approximately £200 per annum, and liabilities of an uncertain, but always costly nature, have been for ever removed from the shoulders of the incumbent.

Enough has been said to prove beyond dispute that the establishment of an agency such as this fills a much-needed want and is desirable from every point of view. One shudders to think of the hopeless muddles into which individual parsons would have landed themselves during the late land boom had it not been for the agency which either carried sales through, or where no sale was feasible, adjusted the rentals. The manifest result has been that the glebe-owning parson has obtained a far more equitable return than has in the past fallen to his lot, with the additional advantage that in the vast majority of cases the personal element did not enter into the transaction at all.

But the present and the future must be thought of. The land boom is a thing of the past. It was extraordinary while it lasted, and it is most improbable that it will ever return. At the present moment agriculture is under a very dark cloud of depression, and, so far as the outlook is concerned, the writer,

frankly acknowledging himself to be a pessimist of pessimists, sees no hope whatever for the industry unless the urban dweller changes his attitude on the question of cheap food in general and the "cheap loaf" in particular. The position of the landowner is rapidly becoming as difficult as that of the tenant farmer and agricultural labourer. In the end he will probably be in the most difficult position of the three. The present depressed condition of agriculture, even if the writer's gloomy forebodings are happily wrong, must seriously affect the glebe-owning parson. In many cases his land is now practically unsaleable. It seems inevitable that existing rents will have to be reduced, especially when new tenants have to be found, and that many questions will arise between landlord and tenant which only an expert can satisfactorily answer.

It seems, therefore, increasingly imperative that all glebe-owning incumbents should entrust the management of their glebes to men who are experts, to men who have been trained and are really qualified to deal with all the intricate problems which the ownership of land involves, and problems which are bound to become more intricate so long as the present depression lasts. It is high time that the services of unqualified men as "agents" should be dispensed with. People do not go to lawyers for medical advice, or to doctors in order to draw up their wills; if they did, there would be an inevitable mess. Surely the inference is plain enough.

The ideal state of things would be reached if only, by some miracle, all glebe and tithe owning incumbents in a specified area, either diocese or archdeaconry or county, would agree to the same agent managing their affairs. The Notts Glebe and Tithe Agency would have done even better work than it has already accomplished if every incumbent had sunk his individual preference for the common good, but the difficulty of getting all the clergy to combine, even in a matter of their material interests, is notorious and practically insuperable. It is well within the bounds of probability that one of the next measures to be introduced into the House of National Assembly will have as its object the compulsory management and supervision of all glebe except that lying immediately round the house. Such a measure will be the natural sequence to that dealing with ecclesiastical dilapidations. Considering the extremely haphazard way in which many glebes have been, and are, still being managed, with consequent depreciation and loss of income, it will be difficult to offer any reasoned objection to this new form of compulsion and of removing all initiative from the parson's hands. If the clergy are to be compelled to provide for their own pensions, and to carry out

their dilapidation responsibilities in a certain prescribed method and in no other (and the measures dealing with these two subjects are almost certain to become law before many months are past), it is not at all to be wondered at that the principle of compulsion should be extended to the management of their glebes. It may be that in every diocese a glebe and tithe agency will be set up, with as full powers in its particular sphere as the Diocesan Dilapidations Board will possess. For after all glebe is trust property, and, as such, it is positively wrong that it should be mismanaged or so managed that the best results should not accrue either to the present owners or to those who will succeed them.

There is one more point which merits consideration, and it is this. Undoubtedly, the most pitiful cases of clerical poverty are to be found in small, isolated country parishes, more especially where the endowment consists for the most part of glebe. Cases are on record where the poverty would not have been so acute had the glebe been properly managed. It is not fair to ask or to expect laymen to contribute to the relief of poverty under these circumstances. On the other hand, there cannot be a more powerful argument than that which can truthfully urge that the very best is being made of the resources of a benefice, that its land is expertly managed, and yet the income does not provide a "living wage." An appeal based on these facts will not fall on deaf ears, and the laymen have a right to expect that every appeal should be so based.

Everything points to the necessity of all land belonging to benefices in the aggregate amounting to an immense acreage, being managed on sound business lines. It has often been suggested that the Ecclesiastical Commissioners should take it over and deal with it as they have already done with episcopal and capitular estates. But there are many obstacles in the way, the chief being the cost of administering small scattered properties. That some expert supervision is necessary is beyond dispute. The clergy as a whole must be relieved of the anxiety and worry, increased a hundredfold when they are ignorant of the very elements of the science attached to the management of their glebes, and unless each incumbent for himself, or each diocese, on behalf of its glebe-owning incumbents, engages the services of an expert land agent, then the day is not far distant when the glebe will be taken out of the incumbent's hands, whether he likes it or not. Such a step will cause much heart-burning, but it will make for efficiency.

H. R. M. Hutt.

ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS (II.)

The defects of the Ecclesiastical Courts, which make them ineffective instruments of discipline, are not of recent development. The destructive criticism of them is recent, but it turns partly on abuses of long standing and partly on vices inherent in their constitution. Spiritual discipline is not fittingly exercised by methods of civil or criminal jurisprudence, and by officials trained in those methods. No reform of the existing Courts would be likely to remove these defects, and any Courts newly established would inevitably be tarnished by them. The system of Courts, not this or that detail of the system, is at fault. Any thought, therefore, of a reform which should enable these Courts, in the language of the Royal Commission, to " command the obedience of the clergy," is an idle dream. Fifty years ago it might not have been impossible, but criticism of abuses has, since then, given place to criticism of foundations. As instruments of spiritual discipline, the Courts are dead.

But discipline is needed, and therefore another way of discipline must be explored. Two avenues of exploration are open, theoretical and practical. One is plain and luminous, the other is full of pitfalls; both must be essayed.

In theory there is little difficulty. The Diocesan Bishop is by universal consent the fount of spiritual discipline. It lies in his pastoral office, not only to direct, but also to correct those of his flock who need correction. He is solemnly asked, at his consecration, whether he is ready " to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrine," whether he will " correct and punish " those within his diocese who may be " unquiet, disobedient, and criminous." It is to be done, says the questioner, " according to such authority as you have by God's Word, and as to you shall be committed by the Ordinance of this Realm." Here are two kinds of authority vested in the Bishop: one which he has by the Word of God, and which must, therefore, be inalienable from his office, the other added by a commission from the civil power. It is this added power which enables an English Bishop to control, not only the spiritual activities of his flock, but also to some small extent their temporal goods. It is a doubtful boon. Armed with this twofold authority, the Bishop is the fount of discipline, and in his proper superior measure the same is true of the Archbishop of a province. There is no escape from this. The Ecclesiastical Courts, which are supposed actually

to exercise discipline, can act only in the name of Archbishop or Bishop.

That doubtful boon of added power is the chief ground on which the existence of Ecclesiastical Courts can be defended. In politics the separation of powers, executive, legislative, and judicial, is characteristic of civilization, and an independent judicature is recognized as the best safeguard of justice. Under the control of an imperfect analogy a similar division of function has appeared in the Church; the Bishop is thought of as executive, the Diocesan Chancellor as judge. There was some excuse for this when the Church became, in Creighton's phrase, "to a great extent the counterpart of the world," and undertook the control of things pertaining to the world. The Church has been almost entirely relieved of that incongruous function, but some vestiges remain. The Ecclesiastical Courts can still claim by law the imprisonment of contumacious suitors or defendants, can order the payment of costs and, in some cases, enforce the payment, can deprive the clergy of their endowments, and oust them from their homes; functions which belong properly to the civil power. These things are anachronistic, and should cease. They are alien to the spiritual constitution of the Church, and have been a cause of confusion. The authority committed to Bishops, "by the Ordinance of this Realm," is the root of bitterness which has smothered spiritual discipline. The certainty that these evils would be perpetuated, entirely or in part, by any reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts, makes any such reform hopeless. The courts are past mending, and should be ended.

By the high road of theory, all is plain going. For a thousand years and more spiritual discipline was practically, as well as theoretically, in the hands of the Bishops. Why should they not resume it? It is sometimes answered that they lack judicial training and the judicial habit of mind. Bishops themselves have been known to say it. The objection shows how deeply a false conception of pastoral authority has bitten into current thought. Spiritual discipline has little in common with forensic jurisprudence, civil or criminal, and has been ruined by the adoption of forensic methods. The broad principles of justice and equity are the same everywhere, and they are needed in all exercise of discipline; but they are not imbedded only, or even eminently, in forensic minds. The answer to the objection is that the exercise of disciplinary power is one of the chief functions of the pastorate, and, if a Bishop is not fit to be entrusted with it, he is—to speak quite bluntly—not fit to be a Bishop at all. In point of fact, I do not think that Bishops are conspicuously wanting in justice and

equity. If they have sometimes seemed to fall short of our expectations, it may be precisely because they have neglected their disciplinary functions, confining themselves to exhortation and administration. A preacher is apt to be one-sided, and an executive kept apart from other functions of government always tends to become arbitrary. But it seems to be recognized that our Bishops, thus disabled, do retain a sufficient sense of equity. I think the Bishop of Durham is one of those who have noted the episcopal lack of the judicial mind; his lordship is one of the most criticized, not to say the most abused of prelates, but I have heard a bitter opponent, within his own diocese, confess that with all his faults of manner he is a mirror of justice.

When all is said, the Bishops we have are those that we have, and perhaps we have those that we deserve; we must make the best of them until we get better. It is to those we have that the discipline of the Church is entrusted by the providence of God, not to those that we sigh for. I am still marching on the high road of theory, though not without glancing at the landscape. It brings me to a scene which I can picture. The Bishop has summoned an offender to appear before him, having first, not once or twice only, entreated him as a father. He does not sit alone, but follows the rule laid down for himself by St. Cyprian in a letter to the clergy of Carthage, not to administer penitential discipline "upon the foot of my own authority only, without taking along with it your advice and the approbation of my people." He has therefore convoked his diocesan synod, requesting the attendance also of some notable laymen. The synod is a cumbrous affair, very unlike the gathering at Carthage, but that is one of the awkward consequences of our present diocesan arrangements, and must be endured until they are reformed. If the precedent of the third century seem antiquated and fusty, one more recent, posterior to the erection of Ecclesiastical Courts, may be adduced. In the year 1300, Godfrey Giffard, Bishop of Worcester, convened a synod at Hartlebury, and submitted to it the question whether he should take proceedings against a notorious pluralist, a clerk in orders of some kind, the holder of fourteen benefices with cure of souls, who had been removed from the King's Bench for perversion of justice, but was now reinstated by the English Justinian, Edward I. He was evidently a person not to be tackled without caution. The synod gave its opinion, "that as Ralph de Mengham was one of the King's Council, it was inexpedient to proceed against him."* The precedent is not

* I quote from one of the papers contributed by Canon Wilson to the Worcestershire Archæological Society, 1918.

encouraging to those who desire a tightening of discipline, but it may serve to reassure some who dread a flouting of the royal prerogative. It will serve also as a model of procedure; and so our pictured Bishop, after solemn invocation of the Holy Spirit, lays before the synod the broad facts of the case that troubles him, so far as known, and puts the question whether it is *prima facie* a case for censure. One remembers that in regard to other matters a grand jury is still thought to be not entirely useless. The synod assenting, a committee is appointed to assist the Bishop in a public examination of the particulars, the accused being entitled to the help of any friend he may choose to appear for him. On the report of the committee, the Bishop will either quash the proceedings or finally consult the synod as to the penance to be imposed, but the actual censure will be his own. It is needless to say that appeals will be allowed; but, travelling rapidly on this high road of theory, I cannot halt to consider every detail.

The penance imposed, or the censure, may touch the temporal interests of the offender, involving the loss of an office with its emoluments and amenities. What then? The Bishop, relying only on the authority given him by God's Word, will have no power over such things; if questioned, he will have to reply, "Who made me a judge or divider over you?" What will happen? There are enthusiasts who will say that the Church should treat such things with contempt, leaving the offender to enjoy them until his conscience moves him to renunciation, or the course of nature removes him altogether. I think that is too hard a purism. But the Bishop has shot his bolt, and can do no more. What remains? The only alternative is recourse to an authority competent to deal with such matters. In England that can be nothing but one of the King's Courts of Justice. The proceedings will be quite straightforward and ordinary. There will be no pretence of clothing the court with any ecclesiastical character; it will merely have to determine who is entitled to the enjoyment of certain properties or amenities. The Church may possibly be deprived of the use of these, for a time or even permanently; but that is a misfortune that must be endured, as many such mishaps have been endured in the past.

On what principles would this decision be based? There is an interesting precedent. In the year 269, Paul of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch, was deposed by a council sitting in that city, and Domnus was elected in his place. Relying on his own popularity and the support of Zenobia, Paul refused to surrender the buildings and other property belonging to the see. Three years later, when the Emperor Aurelian overthrew

Zenobia and arrived at Antioch, he was asked to determine judicially the ownership of this property. The position was paradoxical; Christianity was a *religio inlicita*, and Aurelian himself was soon to revive the Decian persecution. But the splendid tradition of Roman justice prevailed; by whatever title, the professors of this unlawful cult were owners of the property, and he had only to decide whether Paul or Domnus had the better claim. To escape from local jealousies, he ruled that the claimant who was recognized by the Bishops of Rome and Italy should be put in possession.

Should this precedent also be thought antiquated, there is one of much more recent date. In the year 1871, a precisely similar question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, and a luminous judgment was delivered, which, on its intrinsic merits, has been accepted by legal authorities throughout the United States.* "Freedom of religious profession and worship," said the Court, "cannot be maintained if the civil courts tread upon the domain of the Church, construe its canons and rules, dictate its discipline, and regulate its trials. The larger portion of the Christian world has always recognized the truth of the declaration, 'a Church without discipline must become, if not already, a Church without religion.' It was as much a delusion to confer religious liberty without the right to make and enforce rules and canons, as to create government with no power to punish offenders." This being so, "the Church should guard its own fold; enact and construct its own laws; enforce its own discipline; and thus will be maintained the boundary between the temporal and spiritual power." The two powers are remarkably compared: "Civil courts have duties and responsibilities devolved upon them, and a well-defined jurisdiction to maintain. The Church has more solemn duties, more weighty responsibilities, and an authority granted by the infinite Author of all things." The responsibilities being thus distinct, "we have no right," says the Court, "and therefore will not exercise the power to dictate ecclesiastical law. We do not aspire to become *de facto* heads of the Church, and, by construction or otherwise, abrogate its laws and canons." As for parties claiming relief, they voluntarily attached themselves to the Church with a presumed knowledge of its rules, and "as the civil power cannot interfere in matters of conscience, faith, or discipline, they must submit to rebuke or excommunication, however unjust, by their adopted spiritual rulers." Reviewing the position of a minister appointed by the Church, the Court said:

* It is printed in full as an appendix to the Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, 1881.

"It would be a mockery of language to say that the agreement for a salary thus made constituted a vested right, a right which could not be suspended. The salary depended upon the continued performance of the duties of rector. The contract must be construed and enforced by reference to the canons which form a part of it. If the minister was suspended or deposed for any ecclesiastical offence, the payment would cease." On the particular matter in debate the judgment was peremptory: "The sentence of the Church judicatory, in a proper case, deprives of the position, and salary and emoluments are gone."

Would an English Court act on these principles? In view of the well-known judgment of the House of Lords, in the case of the Free Church of Scotland, there is room for doubt. The United Free Church was deprived of buildings and endowments, by a judgment based on principles that contradicted some of its most cherished convictions. There was no help for it, and no redress but in a partial relief by remedial legislation. Such losses may have to be endured with patience.

But we must leave the open road of theory to plunge into the jungle of practical considerations. At this point I seem to hear whispered the terrible word "disestablishment," less terrible now than formerly, but still, perhaps, to be deprecated. Establishment of the Church by law, whatever it may mean, is the work of the State alone, and the Church cannot disestablish itself. As things are, the straightforward exercise of spiritual discipline is hampered and restrained by a multiplicity of laws, ancient and modern. What is possible under these conditions?

I recall what has been said about the Church Discipline Act of 1840. It is known that the purpose of the promoters of this Act was to revive the personal action of the Bishop in all disciplinary proceedings against the clergy. That purpose does not control the interpretation of the Act, but it was in effect fulfilled. The Bishop is set free to institute, either of his own motion or in pursuance of a complaint laid before him, a preliminary enquiry about alleged offences of a clergyman. He is equally free to refuse an enquiry. If the commissioners appointed to enquire report that there is a *prima facie* case against the suspect, he may then, with certain formalities of notice, "require the party to appear, either in person or by his agent duly appointed, as to the said party may seem fit, before him at any place within the diocese," and there he will, with the aid of three assessors, hear and determine the cause, "and pronounce sentence thereupon, according to the ecclesiastical law." The proceedings are hedged about with strictly defined conditions, but these are all reasonable, and, for the most part, such as elementary justice demands.

During the ten years following the enactment of the statute, several Bishops used their new freedom with good effect, especially that notable prelate Henry Phillpotts of Exeter, some of whose judgments have been quoted with respect by legal writers. But, unhappily, an alternative procedure is provided. On receiving the report of the commission of enquiry, the Bishop may send the case by letters of request to the appellate court of the province, so that it passes entirely out of his own control, and comes under the old and discredited jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts. The Bishops generally fell back on this alternative, and the original purpose of the Act was frustrated. It has not, however, been forgotten, and on a recent occasion the late Bishop of Bath and Wells determined a case in person with happy results.

The procedure prescribed by the Act, so far as it is prescribed, leaves something to be desired, and the Supreme Court of Illinois would probably hold that such legislation does not properly "maintain the boundary between the temporal and spiritual power." But if the Bishops accept the conditions of their liberation from certain trammels, it is not for others to complain. The conditions are not onerous, and do not destroy the liberty which they hedge. I am moved to ask whether a careful observance of the conditions would not be compatible with the ideal procedure which I have sketched. There is apparently nothing to prevent a Bishop from doing all that he is free to do in the presence and with the advice of his synod. For the preliminary enquiry, indeed, such counsel is hardly needed, but he could resolve in synod to institute proceedings or to let the matter lapse, and in synod he could hear and determine the cause. The definite censure would still be his own, and he could make it plain that he was acting, not by any power derived from the statute or committed to him by an ordinance of the realm, but in virtue of the authority given him by God's Word. Should he act in this way, it is difficult to see how the most intransigent upholder of the spiritual independence of the Church could object to the discipline imposed. The solution of an urgent problem would be achieved; a decree so made would "rest on moral authority," and would "command the obedience of the clergy."

But two complications remain. A Bishop is not allowed by law to use this procedure in the case of those grave moral disorders which are sometimes the subject of discipline. They may be dealt with only under the Clergy Discipline Act of 1892, a strange measure which once more excludes the Bishop from the tribunal of discipline, puts him in the odious position of prosecuting his clergy before a lay judge, and finally requires

him, though in fact a suitor, to pronounce the sentence dictated to him by the court, which he himself has had no part in framing. It is a melancholy example of what may be expected from a reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts, and it has the unhappy effect of evoking a measure of artificial sympathy for a man found guilty of the gravest offence. If Bishops will make good use of such liberty as they have by the Act of 1840, we may hope to see the repeal of the Act of 1892 and of the equally objectionable Benefices Act of 1898.

Another complication arises out of the practice of appeals. The Act of 1840 allows an appeal from the Bishop's censure to those discredited tribunals, the Provincial Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There is an opinion, supported by respectable authority, that the possibility of this appeal attaches to the Bishop's procedure the same defects which have undermined the authority of the appellate tribunals. It is argued that a court of first instance is in the same system with those to which an appeal from it will lie. The argument is sound as applying to the ordinary Ecclesiastical Courts, but it seems to me fallacious if applied to the proceedings now in question. The Bishop is not a court, and he conducts these proceedings personally in his pastoral character. The Act itself nowhere speaks of him as holding a court, and, indeed, draws a distinction; in Section 12 it provides that his sentence "may be enforced by the like means as a sentence pronounced by an Ecclesiastical Court of competent jurisdiction"; in Section 17 it provides that, in respect of the attendance of witnesses and the production of writings, the Commissioners of Enquiry, the Bishop, or any one of his assessors, "shall have the same powers for these purposes as now belong to the Consistorial Court." The Bishop, therefore, stands apart from the system of courts, and the pastoral character in which he acts will not be altered by the fact that a law, external to that character, allows an appeal from him to the higher members of the system. The purport of the ruling on appeal may be either to quash his censure or to approve it. In the latter case, one does not see how the spiritual effect of the censure can be vitiated by the approval of another authority. In the former case, there will be one of the unfortunate conflicts between the spiritual and the secular authority which are always possible; and the situation will have to be dealt with, wisely or unwisely, as it arises. It is needless to anticipate the trouble. In the great majority of cases there will probably be no appeal.

I think I have shown a more excellent way, even under existing conditions, than the perilous adventure of attempting a reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts.

T. A. Lacey.

A GLIMPSE GIVEN IN THE EARLIEST GOSPEL

WHOEVER reads St. Mark's narrative of the Passion is arrested and puzzled when he comes to this passage: " A certain young man followed with Him, having a linen cloth cast about him, over his naked body: and they laid hold on him; but he left the linen cloth, and fled naked " (xiv. 51-2). Who was this youth who, when Jesus was seized, and all His disciples had left Him and fled, still sought to follow ? How came he there ? Passing from the supper-room Jesus sought seclusion that last night, and so led the eleven across the Kidron to the garden at a late hour; for, like His ancestor Jacob, He could only bear the suspense if He awaited what confronted Him in the morning wrestling through the night with God. Judas knew the place, for Jesus often resorted thither; did this young man know that ? He could not be there by chance, for then he would not have followed Jesus when arrested and risked arrest himself. Why was he so lightly attired ? Jerusalem stands high, and in the springtime nights are cold there. Why was it worth while to record this incident in a narrative so brief, where so much is omitted ? What connection has it with anything before or after ?

Various answers have been attempted. Some have compared the mention of Alexander and Rufus, sons of the cross-carrier, in the next chapter, who may have been alive and known in Rome when St. Mark wrote (*cf.* Rom. xvi. 13), and suggested that the same might be true of this young man. But that is unlikely, for then he would have been named as Rufus is. Some have fancied he was " the beloved disciple " who wrote the Fourth Gospel, refusing to identify the author with John ben Zebedee. But if the author be not identified with John, there is no evidence whatever to support identification with this young man. An answer which has gained some credence is, that the youth was Mark himself. Zahn suggests that here we have " the signature of the artist in a dark corner of the picture." Some weight is given to this conjecture by Professor Burkitt's adoption of it, for he carries it a little further: " There is one incident in the Gospel of Mark which is absolutely pointless as it stands. . . . It is difficult to avoid the inference that the youth was the Evangelist himself, and that he is giving his personal experience. Can we doubt that it was he who saw and heard in Gethsemane when Peter and James and John were sleeping ? It may even be conjectured that the last supper itself was held in the house of Mary the mother of John Mark, and that the dating by days, almost after the manner of a

diary, which characterizes the story from Palm Sunday onwards, corresponds to actual reminiscences of the author who had lived through the events of that memorable week when a boy, and had himself been a witness of some of them" (*Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus*, p. 80). This sounds interesting, as Professor Burkitt is sure to be, but it is not convincing. True, some fifteen years later, Acts xii. 12 shows that Mark's mother had a house in Jerusalem where "many" Christians gathered, but there is nothing to identify it with the house to which the disciples, who prepared for the Passover, were led by following a man bearing a pitcher of water. At the later date Mark, who was taken soon after to Antioch by his cousin Barnabas and Saul, was apparently still a young man; and the date when he wrote his Gospel confirms this. He might have been a boy at the time of the Crucifixion, but not old enough to describe himself as a young man (νεανίσκος), a term used for any age between the earliest manhood and some forty years. Doubtless, the diary-like structure of Mark's Passion story points to personal reminiscence; but whose? There is no more reason for saying Mark's own here than elsewhere throughout the Gospel. Why not to Peter's, whose recollections Mark often listened to in later years? It is still more fanciful to suppose that what is related of the Agony must have been seen and heard by the unnamed young man, because the three disciples who alone were near all slept. They did not drop asleep instantly. Their Master urged them to watch, and they tried hard to keep awake. And so little is reported of that long agonizing night that it is most natural they should have seen and heard, at least as much before sleep overcame them or after they were roused by Him. Moreover, the Agony is told with fullest detail, not in St. Mark's Gospel, but in St. Luke's. Who can believe that Mark was an eye-witness, and noted his own presence in the garden, but yet omitted to record the climax of the Agony, and only told the most vivid details to Luke later on so that he could include them in his Gospel? This solution of the puzzle which the young man presents is no more satisfying than the others.

The best way to deal with the problem is to observe carefully what St. Mark's narrative actually tells, and to ask what can be inferred from this. It tells two things only about the young man, apart from his age: (i.) He tried to follow Jesus after His arrest, and when they endeavoured to lay hold on him he fled. (ii.) He was clothed only with a robe thrown round him, and when this was clutched he left it behind and ran naked. Do these meagre facts yield grounds for any inference about the young man himself, or about Mark's reason for mentioning him?

They do: they point to the conclusion that he was a Greek, and that this fact made the significance of the incident.

The nakedness is clearly emphasized; it is the only feature mentioned twice in the short passage. Now γυμνὸς does not always mean stark naked, it may only mean "in undress," with nothing over the χιτών; but there is no instance in the New Testament where it appears to bear this sense. In the present passage it would be pointless to speak of an upper garment thrown over the undress tunic beneath; the contrast is drawn between the robe thrown around and the nakedness which it alone covered. And it would be equally pointless to say the youth fled clad in his χιτών; the striking fact, and the only reason for adding anything to "fled," was that he ran away bare. Without doubt the term must be so understood here. Now it was the Greek practice to strip entirely for exercise. Alike in the public baths, which served as clubs and meeting-places do in modern life, and in the palæstra, or athletic ground, which answered to our cricket and football fields, young men commonly associated naked, and so ran, or wrestled, or threw the discus, in the public contests so continually held. The Greeks felt no shame in this, though to the strict Jew it was repulsive, his sense of decency being much more like our own.

The robe is significant too; σινδών does not mean "a linen cloth," but a finely woven fabric, whatever the material might be. Where linen is intended other words are available, and are found in the New Testament (ὀθόνιον, βύσσος). This word was derived from the name of India, and was used for fine textures woven there, and so more generally for similar fabrics; just as we use the term "cambric," which originated in Cambrai, though most "cambric" no longer comes thence. In the New Testament it only occurs here and in the accounts given by the Synoptic Gospels of the wrapper which Joseph of Arimathæa used in burying the Lord's body. In both cases it appears to mean a choice fabric of an expensive kind. Joseph, when he had secured the Lord's body from Pilate, thought the best material he could obtain was alone fit to shroud it; and the young man who appeared for a moment in the garden had thrown round himself a fine and costly robe as his sole covering. This was no Jewish costume; but one not unlikely in a young Greek, who was, perhaps, on his way from some late carousal after evening exercise to his home or lodging, and turned into the garden to see what was going on when a posse of men "with lanterns and torches and weapons" drew his attention. Or, on his way home he may have seen Jesus and the eleven leaving Jerusalem to cross the Kidron

Valley, and, whether recognizing Him or not, may have followed them to see where they were going, and why.

Most readers of the New Testament fail to allow sufficiently for the extent to which Palestine was penetrated by Hellenistic influences at that time. Some three and a half centuries earlier the land had been conquered by Alexander the Great and made a province in his empire. When his early death broke up the empire it did not cease to be Hellenic, but was divided into separate kingdoms, all which were proud to claim that they kept the Greek character and carried on the Greek customs which were identified with civilization. Palestine became a debatable region between Egypt under the Ptolemies and Syria under the house of Seleucus. For the most part, it fell to the latter; and it was the policy of the reigning king always to consolidate his heterogeneous realm as far as he could by replacing everywhere local and native ways by Greek ways, so at once promoting the unity of his dominions, and raising the level of civilization throughout them. That policy culminated under Antiochus Epiphanes and led to the Maccabean revolt. But nothing shows more clearly than its story, told by Jews in ardent sympathy with it, the extent to which the king's hellenizing policy succeeded. The real difficulty, which proved too much for the Maccabean patriots, lay not in the royal armies, nor in the administration of royal officials, so much as in the large number of Jews found ready to embrace the foreign ways. The stricter Jews regarded these as apostates; and the bitterest strife was always between these sections of the Jewish people. The loyal and rigid Jew of the Pharisaic section did not hate the Greek half so much as he hated and feared the Jew who hellenized; and he feared him because of his numbers. For the loyalists, if not a minority, were too small a majority to feel secure in their own country. This description from the second book of Maccabees tells a good deal: "When Seleucus was deceased, and Antiochus who was called Epiphanes succeeded to the kingdom, Jason the brother of Onias supplanted him in the High Priesthood, having promised the king a very large sum . . . if it might be allowed him through the king's authority to set him up a Greek place of exercise, and to form a body of youths to be trained therein, and to register the inhabitants of Jerusalem as citizens of Antioch. And when the king had given assent, and he had gotten possession of the office, he forthwith brought over them of his own race to the Greek fashion. And . . . he brought in new customs forbidden by the law; for he eagerly established a Greek place of exercise under the citadel itself, and caused the noblest of the young men to wear the Greek cap. And thus there was an extreme

of Greek fashions, and an advance of an alien religion, by reason of the profaneness of Jason, that ungodly man, and no real High Priest. So that the priests no more had any zeal for the services of the altar, but despising the sanctuary and neglecting the sacrifices, they hastened to take part in the unlawful provision for the palæstra, after summons to the game of the discus, making of no account the honours of their fathers, and thinking the glories of the Greeks best of all" (iv. 7-15). This was rather less than two centuries before the date of the Crucifixion, and the Maccabean revolt brought about a reaction whose effect continued after the Romans had superseded the House of Seleucus as rulers of Palestine. But in all their Eastern provinces the Romans built on the foundations of Hellenism, and maintained the ways of Greek civilization as far as they could. So at this time the land was deeply penetrated by it, and there were many Jews and others who affected Greek habits, making foreign fashions a point of honour. Especially among the young men who were well-to-do was this the vogue, and many such liked to forget as far as they could that they were Jews.

In the short description which St. Mark gives of the young man at Gethsemane, the only distinctive features indicate that if not a Greek by race he was one of those hellenizing young Jews who posed as Greeks, and followed extravagant Greek fashions. It is quite natural to find such a young man of fashion keeping late hours, and clad only in a finely woven and expensive ἱμάτιον thrown round his otherwise naked body; quite natural, too, that when some tried to capture him and seized hold of it, he should let it go and run off naked as he was accustomed to run in the athletic field with crowds looking on. But no strict Jew would have acted thus.

Of course, this conclusion does not tell us who he was, but it shows the type of man, and thus discloses why St. Mark recorded the incident. For the one thing is the clue to the other. The young man was a Greek, or, at least, one who wished to be reckoned a Greek; for at that date the term did not connote race so much as speech and civilization. Now Jesus, in all His earlier work, felt that He "was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Matt. xv. 24); but in the final stage others were drawn to Him. So St. John tells how "there were certain Greeks among those that went up to worship at the feast," who sought out Philip, saying, "We would see Jesus." And He received them, being deeply moved, and explaining: "The hour is come, that the Son of man should be glorified" (xii. 20-23). St. John evidently felt that the fact had deep significance and recorded it, though there were

many other things that Jesus did which he wrote not in his book. So when a young man, shown by his dress and conduct to be a Greek, was seen at the last moment following Jesus as eagerly and boldly as His own disciples, and even after they left him and fled, the fact was felt to have a significance of its own, and was found worthy of record. Was there not in this a premonition that after He was lifted up Jesus "would draw all men unto Himself"? That did not perhaps strike Peter at the time, but in the years of later experience it came home to his mind, and then the strange incident he once had witnessed stood out in remembrance with new meaning for him, and he dwelt on it sometimes. Is it too much to say that only misunderstanding can call this incident in Gethsemane "absolutely pointless as it stands,"* or deem it "irrelevant to what goes before or after"?† The debt of Christianity to Greece is far too deep to let us be indifferent to any glimpse of the spell which the Lord Jesus cast on a Greek mind. That stark figure, seen for a moment white against the background of night into which it disappears, may make us feel afresh that in the Lord Jesus whom he tried to follow is "the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek" (Rom. i. 16).

E. P. Boys-Smith.

RELIGION AND POETRY

During the years of the present century there has been a marked increase in the number of poetry readers, but the reasons which account for this are by no means so gratifying as the fact itself. Poetry has come within the range of popular appreciation by ceasing to wrestle with ethical problems for twenty pages, and by dealing with the material objects and experiences with which everyone is familiar in a lyric of three or four verses. The Georgian ideal of simplicity tinged with intellectual conceit has triumphed over the Victorian ideal of profundity elaborated with metaphysical speculation; and the result, if not actually chaos, is at least the destruction of those fundamental principles which made the poetry of the middle nineteenth century so imposing, so truly great, and, at the same time, so entirely characteristic of the age it both explained and inspired.

Victorian poetry was woven not so much into the very fibre of every-day existence as is Georgian poetry, but rather into the moral and intellectual doubts as to man's relation

* Prof. Burkitt: *Op. cit.* supra.

† Bp. Gore: *Belief in God*, p. 188.

to God, and, in a lesser degree, to his fellow-men as well, which remained a constant background to all the various developments of the Victorian character. They were not ashamed to speak of their problems, mainly the outcome of the growth of democracy implicit in industrial progress, Darwin's *Origin of Speices* and the consequences involved in the Oxford Movement, and since their poets as well as their philosophers had the courage to take themselves seriously, it was not unnatural that poetry, as being the greatest medium for expression possessed by man, should become the peg upon which religious controversies could profitably be hung. Contemporary poetry was, therefore, not a drawing-room of pleasant trifles laid for afternoon tea, but an arena in which authority and evidence jousted against each other to the death.

It is the peculiar property of religion that it attracts to itself all that is violent and intolerant in man, whether it be in support or in unyielding antagonism, for which reason the history of religion has been, until quite lately, so largely the history of persecution, and so all through Victorian poetry—more susceptible than the poetry of any other age to the trend of current thought—runs the religious motif, varying in intensity with different poets, but almost invariably present and quite invariably sincere. Religious ideas were so much more clearly formulated then, points of contention were obvious and tangible, and, just as in their politics, the Victorians found it easy to become partisans with definite beliefs to defend which were, so to speak, written down for them in black and white. They held to the rules of debate which made their poetry easy to classify, for in perspective we see it as a poetry of movements, each movement, if not quite clear-cut and distinctive, at least consistent enough to enable one to generalize with a reasonable amount of accuracy. The attitude adopted towards religion was, more than anything else, the test question which made it possible for such definite movements to exist, and it was under religious banners, bearing, if not actual creeds, at least formulas of belief, that the Victorian poets took their stand.

Widely different were the inscriptions the banners showed. It is not a little strange that, at a time when religious controversies were so rife, no poet should stand out as the protagonist of atheism. Neither Shelley nor Swinburne fell within the golden period of Victorian literature, the one coming too early and the other too late, but even if they had been true contemporaries, there was that about their poetry which was antagonistic to, rather than typical of, Victorianism at its most characteristic period. It is true that Shelley, with his pre-

occupation with the philosophy of liberty, foreshadowed much of what was to come, but with all his atheism he remained at heart essentially a romanticist, which made him far more akin to Keats, who was so purely a poet, than to others coming after him, who confounded heresy with science as he confounded slavery with religion. In an age of religious flux, Shelley found no great disciple to carry on the propagation of his ideas, and Swinburne, with a paganism that was irrational and instinctive rather than reasoned and logical, and which had no real conviction behind it, came to deal a blow at philosophic poetry and to prepare the way for the deluge of poetasters that followed him.

Of all the truly characteristic Victorian poets it was, perhaps, Matthew Arnold's philosophic and scholarly doubt that came nearest to the violent unbelief of Shelley. It was natural for the Victorians to believe in things. The imposing solidness with which they surrounded themselves, the solemnity with which they invested all that they did, the seriousness of their outlook, the consciousness of their own importance, were all incentives to belief in a power which would take good care that their valued careers in life would not be unworthily crowned after death. In the idea of atheism, of the body crumbling to dust, the extinction of the soul, the Victorians sensed a dangerous philosophy that would render their pomposity ridiculous. Matthew Arnold, and perhaps Clough—but he was too much an individualist to admit any satisfactory generalization—could never achieve that triumphant and unshakable faith in the ultimate goodness and purpose of things which so characterizes Browning. Matthew Arnold's formulation of belief is inconclusive. Like his own Scholar Gypsy, he seems perpetually awaiting the spark from heaven, which in his case never falls. As scent clings to an old dress, so is his poetry pervaded by a vague melancholy which broods over the futility of men who

> "eddy about
> Here and there, eat and drink,
> Chatter and love and hate,
> Gather and squander, are raised
> Aloft, are hurled in the dust,
> Striving, blindly achieving
> Nothing,"

and which refuses the comfortable doctrine of an eternity illogically compensating a misspent life on earth. In direct contradiction to Matthew Arnold stands Browning, and just as the former fails to be quite typical of Victorian thought in the over-sensitiveness of his doubts, so Browning is too assertive and self-assured in an age more concerned with arguments

than with conclusions. Browning most essentially believed in God, and here he was entirely representative of the class for whom he spoke, but in his complete confidence as to the final outcome of all the complications engendered by the shifting of the political balance of power, he found himself more or less alone, cut off by his invincible optimism from the majority who viewed the rapid growth of democracy with an alarm that was not untempered by fear.

Moreover, he was too concerned with the individual soul and its duty of self-realization to be acceptable to the majority, who were inclined to indulge a passion for labels, and who looked upon a man less as an individual than as a member of a definite class or church, and whose worth was to be determined only by the validity of the creed in which he believed. In the enthusiasm of his belief that

> " after the Last returns the First,—
> Though a wide compass round be fetched,
> That what begun best can't end worst,
> Nor what God blessed once prove accurst,"

they saw evidences of a pantheism antagonistic to their conception of salvation ordered by definite rules and subject to invariable conditions.

Between these two, but rather nearer to Browning than Matthew Arnold, stands Tennyson. No poet perhaps has been subject to so much criticism, whether friendly or hostile, as he. He has suffered from excess of praise, and from the inevitable reaction to abuse that it occasions, but now that we are withdrawn to a dispassionate view-point we can see that, quite apart from his actual poetic merit, he stands out an impressive figure, personifying in himself the fundamentals of the Victorian character. If Gladstone was the Grand Old Man of Victorian politics, so was Tennyson of Victorian literature. He stood for the ideal of order, of progress rigidly controlled, leading up to a definite climax, and behind it all, God as the Architect of the world scheming for the perfection of his own design. Conscientiously he tried to reconcile evolution with Christianity, making them completing and not competing ideals, showing evolution as a divine method for the advancement of humanity controlled by God, Whom, one feels, Tennyson looked upon as a stabilizing influence in a world prone to exaggeration and untidiness, leading it on the stepping-stones of its dead self to higher things, until at last is found " the deathless Angel seated in the vacant tomb." It is conceived in perfect harmony with the spirit of Victorianism; God not so much a Comforter and a Friend, but an Architect working out the salvation of mankind upon a comprehensive

plan based upon a system of law and order. It is this conception that made everything that concerned the Church, however trifling, of such momentous importance. It was necessary that the Church, the embodiment of the Christian ideal, the militant body founded by Christ with a definite work to perform, should be brought to that high pitch of efficiency which can only be realized by organization and scrupulous attention to rules. If the Church was to bring discipline into a lawless and haphazard world, then the Church itself must be disciplined and ordered. Thus roughly grew up what is known as the Oxford Movement, which, at its source purely religious, spread and spread until it made its influence felt in every phase of national life. Nothing illustrates so clearly the interest taken in religion by educated Victorians as the fact that this ritualistic revival started by a few young men should so flutter the dovecots of Victorian intellectuals and drive them either into enthusiastic support or determined opposition. Newman and Pusey, and at the beginning Clough on one side with Tennyson paternally in sympathy, and Maurice and Kingsley, fathers of the succeeding Broad Church Movement on the other, and all the while, like a strong under-current far below the troubled transient waves of the surface, ran the devotional poetry of Keble and Christina Rossetti; but this poetry, the pure essence of spiritual adoration untainted by the materialism of religious politics, belongs not to the Victorian ideal of religion, but to the religion of all ages. With the coming of Swinburne and his allies, the Pre-Raphaelites, a relationship which, although not obvious to contemporaries, can in perspective be seen to exist even though they are held not so much by any avowed similarity of ideals, but rather by a loose sympathy finding its expression in motive rather than result, the structures upon which the edifice of true Victorian poetry was erected collapsed. The new movement, instead of looking forward to a time when the world should move with an ordered civilized decorum, looked back to a time when it ran free with the unconscious beauty of abandon, Swinburne sighing for the "fearless old fashion" and the Pre-Raphaelites, more concerned with art than life, for mediævalism which mothered with so fine an impartiality those strangely related brethren.

Religious fervour burnt itself out, church politics became of indifferent interest, P. R. B. became P. R. A., and a new generation of poets came singing in a minor key, taking for their banner a decorative design by Beardsley and the line of Dowson "Sufficient for the day are the day's evil things" as an inscription. What is known as the Georgian movement finds its truest expression in Rupert Brooke, writing some ten years

after Kipling with his *Barrack-room Ballads* had done so much to democratize the aristocratic art of poetry. It is pre-eminently the poetry of the things with which we live. It was as though the young generation growing up strong and confident before the war had said: "We are tired of capital letters—of Art—Truth—God. They do not exist, or if they do, which we admit is quite possible, we are not going to waste our time looking for them. Too long have men scanned the heavens and so neglected the beauty of the earth beneath their feet, and by earth we do not mean only Nature, which has had her meed of praise, but rather those material things which we know so well and to which we are so ungrateful for all the loveliness and comfort they afford."

> "White plates and cups, clean-gleaming;
> Ringed with blue lines; and feathery, faery dust;
> Wet roofs, beneath the lamp-light; the strong crust
> Of friendly bread; and many-tasting food;
> Rainbows; and the blue bitter smoke of wood."

That is the essence of Georgianism—a hedonism untainted by excess, unrelieved by spirituality. There is much that is charming, much that is technically competent, much that is of true beauty in the poetry of the present day, but in adhering so strictly to the narrow intimate circle of interests which were its original inspiration, there is grave danger of the continuity of the poetic ideal being broken. Like Ophelia, the poets of to-day turn "thought and affliction, passion, hell itself, to favour and prettiness," to which they add an intellectual adroitness of their own. In abolishing obscurity of expression, that bugbear of the timid, intermittent reader and the besetting sin of the philosophic school, they substitute an obscurity of motif. Modern poetry is much ado about rather a little. One reads the volumes of verse that are continually appearing with an appreciation of their craftsmanship and finally puts down the book wondering that so slight an inspiration could make so many poems. In almost every case the single idea round which the poem is built is, although admirable in itself, far too slight to support the whole structure. There are many singing voices in England to-day, but the songs are not worthy of the best traditions of English poetry, for there is more in England than the woods of Grantchester and more in poetry than technical excellence. Some ruling motif is wanted to make the whole unwieldy mass of verse comprehensible. The war has come and gone, devastating in its advent, curiously remote and insignificant now that it has passed, leaving an almost incredibly small influence upon the generation of poets who write the same delightful inconsequent verse that charmed

the ears of an idle, unheeding world in 1914. More than ever before, perhaps, does the world need the stimulus of a spiritual impulse, but poetry, which is the medium through which ideals can best be represented, has ranged its forces on the side of materialism, thereby signing the preliminaries of its own death warrant. The alliance between religion and poetry is an alliance with a great tradition and a long history of high achievement behind it. It has been the direct inspiration of much that is truly great in the field of artistic endeavour. Religion, in spite of certain deplorable but inevitable restrictions, mothered the child art in the hour of its weakness, but now that religion in its own hour of need calls for help, its cries are ignored by the child that has grown into the able and independent man, who is yet too blind to see that his life is all vanity should his foster-mother be allowed to perish in the wilderness.

There is a feeling of restless expectancy in the world, as though, in spite of a deliberately acquired deafness to the things that are of real importance, men's minds are keyed to an expectant pitch for some spiritual renaissance which would fill them again with the hopes which now they dare not utter. The thoughts of men are full of God, although the churches are empty, and behind a pathetic mask of indifference humanity awaits a lead which would set it joyously upon the task of building the new Jerusalem upon the green and pleasant lands scarred so hideously by the furrows of war. It is poetry which should give that lead, which should strike that note of disinterested service in a world brought to a definite crisis in its history from which either chaos or else a far higher and more intelligent civilization must eventually emerge.

The issue lies in the hands of those who by the advantages of education and the accident of genius are possessed of a deeper vision into the moral and material problems of the world than others who live a hand-to-mouth existence with no interests outside the immediate one of increasing their own particular property. If these, looking down the corridors of the future and seeing only the looming possibilities of disaster, shrug their shoulders and go on writing their poems in praise of the transient things that they love, then, indeed, are they hastening the evil that they themselves prophesy. Perhaps, however, it is not altogether their own fault that their writings are of such little consequence. Religion, and all that is meant by that word, which is the ultimate alternative to the philosophy of materialism, is not presenting its ideas with sufficient strength. In its tolerance it loses enthusiasm, in its breadth, depth. If it has ceased to arouse persecution it fails to awaken interest.

It is not within the scope of this survey to attempt an

investigation into the causes that have led to the unfortunate apathy which only too often attends church services, nor to suggest remedies, but in the too conciliatory tendency of the Church towards all shades of opinion, poetry, which is, after all, largely the expression of emotional extravagance, can find little to inspire it.

If the Church, as representing the religious feeling of the country, would take a more determined stand upon definite points of controversy, if it would adopt a more uncompromising attitude towards questions it is alone competent to judge, if it would appeal unequivocally to the spiritual, poetry would be drawn after it by the inevitable force of magnetism.

As Abraham Lincoln in John Drinkwater's play says: "You can't do the right thing the wrong way. That's as bad as the wrong thing itself," and if the Church in its attempt to bring about a religious revival in England persists in its tolerance which is the outcome of weakness rather than of charity, then the Church can never hope to enlist the highest and noblest on its side.

This is not a time when we can take comfort in the certainty of the pendulum swinging back again. There have been dark ages in literature and religion before, but events did not move so fast then and the next age could, by its splendour, obliterate the memory of the poverty of the one that had gone before, but now, poised as it were upon the brink of catastrophe, there may be no future to work out the convenient law of averages.

Men's hearts to-day may well fail them for fear, but should religion and poetry, each true to its own greatness, stand out as the twin protagonists of the spiritual ideal, they would, by the grace of God, light a candle which should never be put out.

D. C. Carew.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

We are grateful to the Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford for drawing our attention to two great names in the history of the Catholic movement which were not mentioned in the Editorial of last month: "Scott Holland, the inspiring mainspring of our generation in Oxford: Aubrey Moore, the intellectual steadier of us in face of Darwinism." We plead guilty; but we wished to avoid seeming to give a list; for that would have required us to be exhaustive.

The Welsh Church has tackled its financial problems after disendowment with such courage and efficiency that we trust it will not be tempted to jeopardize the great spiritual interests embodied in the Church schools; and we shall look with interest for the upshot of the governing body's decision to ascertain the views of school managers on the "Concordat" proposals. There is no doubt that these proposals have caused considerable anxiety among Welsh Churchmen, and not least among the teachers; and it is important that no precedent should be created which might react to the detriment of the interests of the Church's children in England.

August is the holiday month, and we venture to draw attention to two books which will fill leisure moments with delight. One is *The Legacy of Greece* (Clarendon Press, 7s. 6d. net), a collection of fascinating essays on the contribution of Ancient Greece, post-classical as well as classical, to modern knowledge and civilization. The subjects dealt with include not only philosophy, religion, literature, art, etc., but also such branches of science as mathematics and astronomy, biology, medicine, etc. The very best authorities have been enlisted, such as Professor Gilbert Murray, the Dean of St. Paul's, Sir T. L. Heath, Professor D'Arcy Thompson, and Sir Reginald Blomfield. We congratulate the editor, Mr. R. W. Livingstone, on this scholarly and readable contribution to the promotion of Hellenic studies and all that they stand for.

The other book is of a lighter kind. *On the Margin* (Chatto and Windus, 6s.) is a volume of essays by Mr. Aldous Huxley, packed with humour, irony, and good criticism. You thrill with excitement as he describes the bicycle races in Italy; find your social sense quickened as he tells of Polite Conversation; and gain an æsthetic education by hearing him discourse of Sir Christopher Wren. We hope that Mr. Huxley will give us more in this vein.

The Anglo-Catholic Congress will always be memorable for the opening service in St. Paul's, a monument of reverent and disciplined worship, which fitly crowned the march of ninety years. Time will be required to estimate its value, its mistakes, and its results. Meanwhile, cordial appreciation is due to the indefatigable Secretary, the Rev. H. A. Wilson.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

(*a*) 2 Chron. xxviii.: Oded and the Ruhr.

Oded—who was he? Many of our readers would, perhaps, have to consult a Concordance before answering. And yet he is one of the best Christians in the Old Testament, worthy to rank with the author of the Book of Jonah. "A prophet of the Lord was there, whose name was Oded." This chapter (2 Chron. xxviii.) is our only record of him; but it is quite enough to give him an immortal place in history. It was at the time of the Syro-Ephræmitish War, in the second half of the eighth century B.C. Pekah, the ruffian usurper of the throne of Israel, had smitten Ahaz and the people of Judah with a great slaughter: Israel had slain them, as Oded says in masterly phrase, "in a rage which hath reached up unto heaven" (v. 9); and 200,000 captives, women and children, were taken, with much spoil, to Samaria. This was the judgment of heaven for the apostasy of Judah's king. What was to be done with the prisoners and the spoil? The answer in that day could not be doubtful. The women would become wives and mistresses: the elder children would become slaves: large numbers would be sold: the weakly would be killed or die. The pitiless laws of international revenge would have their way.

"But a prophet of the Lord was there, whose name was Oded: and he went out to meet the host that came to Samaria, and said unto them, Behold, because the Lord, the God of your fathers, was wroth with Judah, he hath delivered them into your hand, and ye have slain them in a rage which hath reached up unto heaven. And now ye purpose to keep under the children of Judah and Jerusalem for bondmen and bondwomen unto you: but are there not even with you trespasses of your own against the Lord your God? Now hear me therefore, and send back the captives, which ye have taken captive of your brethren: for the fierce wrath of the Lord is upon you" (vv. 9-11). It is straightforward enough. "Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us." Mercy springing from penitence, between nations as between individuals. And the appeal was heard. Not directly. No doubt the victors asked what this prophet had to do with political or military questions. Who was he to deprive them of the fruits of fair conquest? But there were others who heard, men of affairs. Were they Pekah's own government? Or were they a kind of Labour party in Samaria? At any rate, "Certain of the heads of the children of Ephraim, Azariah the son of Johanan, Berechiah the son of Meshillemoth, and Jehizkiah the son of Shallum, and Amasa the son of Hadlai" (cumbrous names, but worthy to be remembered) "stood up against them that came from the war," and endorsed what Oded had said. And they prevailed. "So the armed men left the captives and the spoil before the princes and all the congregation" (v. 14). The civil power resumed its rightful position over the military.

Then followed a wonderful outburst of generosity and magnanimous pity. Poor prisoners! half-clothed, boots worn through, faint with hunger and thirst—just such as stumbled along the roads of Venetia after the defeat of Austria in 1918: unforgettable, if ever you have seen them. And often the sword of some Italian officer came down in blows on the laggards. But here—long ago in barbarous Samaria? They "took the captives, and with the spoil clothed all that were naked among them,

and arrayed them, and shod them, and gave them to eat and to drink, and anointed them, and carried all the feeble of them upon asses, and brought them to Jericho, the city of palm trees, unto their brethren: then they returned to Samaria" (v. 15).

Surely, if the prophets searched "what time or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did point unto" (1 Pet. i. 10, 11), we must answer, To-day. Oded is the voice of Christendom, speaking to the victor nations of the European War, and calling them to penitence and pity. Were the victors guiltless—are they guiltless to-day? The ablest of our historians do not say so, even as regards the origin of the war: and no one says it of the Peace. "Ye purpose to keep under the children of Judah"—there, in a nutshell, is the French policy towards Germany. And the Church points to a better way. Use your spoil—your reparations and claims and debts—to set your conquered enemies on their feet again. Cease to think in terms of ruin and destruction; learn that human bonds of penitence and pity are the only security for the future. Dare to trust that good is stronger than evil, and love than hate.

It is a noble lesson—a lesson for every congregation; a chapter to meditate on and study. But there are some strange and sad things to be said. I have hunted in all the O.T. commentaries, etc., I can lay hands on, such as Dummelow's *One Volume Bible Commentary*, Peake's *Commentary on the Bible*, Kittel's *History of the Hebrews*, Kent's *History of the Hebrew People*, Stanley's *History of the Jewish Church;* and not one of them hints at the superb significance of this passage, even if they mention Oded at all. What does it matter if the chapter is difficult to reconcile with the account in 2 Kings xvi.? The truth is that critical theology has largely forgotten what the Bible is. They have been so bemused with their dates and sources and what-not that they have hidden from men's eyes the "Spirit of Christ" behind it. Truly it may be said, "Ye do make the word of God of none effect by *your tradition*."

But there is a stranger anomaly still. This great chapter is appointed in the old Prayer-Book Lectionary to be read in the daily course at Morning Prayer on June 9. Once each year, that is to say, the clergy at least would read it. But in the New Lectionary it has simply disappeared. Its use is not even optional. Is it too much to hope that our authorities might repair the omission, at least in small degree, by appointing it for use on the anniversary of the Armistice, November 11?

E. G. S.

(*b*) St. Luke x. 18: Ἐθεώρουν τὸν Σατανᾶν ὡς ἀστραπὴν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ πεσόντα.

A.V. "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven."

R.V. "I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven."

The meaning of the Greek is plain: Our Lord saw Satan's *fall*, it was like lightning for swiftness. The versions are successful enough in conveying the meaning. The Vulgate has "cadentem," the Syriac "I have been seeing Satan, *that he fell* as lightning that falleth from heaven" (Burkitt, *Evangelion da-Mepharreshe;* similarly Peshitta). The commentaries say little about the point. Plummer says R.V. is "no improvement on A.V." Lonsdale Ragg (1922) remarks that "A.V. is better." Lagrange in his big commentary of over 600 pages (Paris, 1921) translates "tombant," and gives no note. Lietzmann's *Handbuch* renders by the infinitive "fallen" and finds no note necessary.

But R.V. is wrong, and to say that it is no improvement on A.V., or even merely that A.V. is better, is misleading. "Fallen" is the result of an obsolete idea that the aorist must be translated by a past. The grammarians are quite clear that the aorist was not originally a past and that the "timeless aorist" is of frequent occurrence. Especially in the participle, the aorist is then "absolutely timeless, not even relatively past" (Robertson, *Grammar of G.N.T.*, 1st edition, p. 864, *cf.* Moulton, *Prolegomena*, p. 134 *f.*). The meaning of the R.V. rendering is obvious: "fallen" can convey no other sense than that Satan was lying in a huddled heap as a result of his fall. But the Greek for this would be *πεπτωκότα*, as we see in Rev. ix. 1 (the star fallen from heaven). The Revisers translated this aorist quite accurately in Acts ix. 12: *εἶδεν ἄνδρα Ἀνανίαν ὀνόματι εἰσελθόντα καὶ ἐπιθέντα* κτλ. "A man *coming in*," etc.

The inference is that the Revisers made a slip. If "I watched Satan fall," which Moulton suggests, is not to be adopted in a future revision, then it would be best to revert to the A.V. W. K. L. C.

THE SACRED SITES OF PALESTINE

Orte und Wege Jesu. Gustav Dalman. Guterslöh: Bertelsmann. 1921.

Herr Dalman's name was familiar to English students before the war as the writer of the best book on the Words of Jesus, from the Semitic standpoint. He spent the years 1902 to 1917 in Palestine, and has incorporated his studies in the present book. In places the reader feels that a closer acquaintance with literary criticism would have been an advantage, but this is the only possible exception one can take to a book of exceptional merit and beauty. In contrast with Sir George Adam Smith's well-known work it deals only with the roads used and the places visited by our Lord. Year after year the author followed the Master's footsteps until the events lived again before his eyes as, almost certainly, they must have happened. He has a marvellous power of conveying his impressions to the reader. No book which I can remember reading has made the gospel so real to me. Three instances out of a number must suffice.

Commentators have been puzzled by the apparent contradiction between Mark vi. 45, where the disciples set out for Bethsaida, on the east side of Jordan at the head of the lake, and verse 53 in which they are said to arrive at the land of Gennesaret, on the north-west shore. A similar experience befell the author in April, 1908, when he started from the middle of the eastern shore meaning to reach Bethsaida, and was driven by the wind to Capernaum. It is generally stated that sheep could not have been out all night in December. Probably not at Bethlehem; but the ground slopes so rapidly east of the town that an hour away sheltered spots may be found where snow in December is unknown. Dalman with his party spent the night of Christmas Eve, 1912, out in the traditional Field of the Shepherds, and thereby earned the right to hold the unusual view. On April 9, 1913, he had an unforgettable experience. The party had been on the lake. They returned to the beach in the N.W. corner and found that their attendants had lit a fire of coals, and when the flames had died down had put two fishes to roast on the glowing embers. These they offered to the party on landing (*cf.* John xxi. 9).

Nearly always Dalman accepts the traditional sites. Thus the grotto under the choir of the Church of the Holy Nativity at Bethlehem can be traced back to the second century and is almost certainly authentic. The whole chapter on the Nativity is fascinating. Joseph, he thinks, had a

small property at Bethlehem, which would have been forfeited had he not come there to be enrolled. The rents would have been paid in kind, and would have been far too small to live upon, so that he was obliged to settle elsewhere for work. The inn was not a *khan* or *caravanserai*, such being found only on the trade routes. It was a large private house with an upper room used for guests. The difficulty was not to find a place for the child, but an undisturbed spot for the birth. The usual practice was and is for the occupants of the house to turn out, which was impossible in this case. The animals would be quartered in the house, not in a separate stable. But if there was a cave in the vicinity, as early tradition asserts, all is clear. The cave was empty, since the animals were out in the fields. St. Luke may well have avoided mentioning the cave lest his Gentile readers should associate the story with the myth of the birth of Mithras.

If 100 years later the cave was recognized it is incredible that the site of Golgotha and the Tomb was forgotten. The first Jewish Christians were drawn from the people who "built the tombs of the prophets" (Matt. xxiii. 29). They had to answer the objections raised in Matt. xxviii. Before A.D. 70 the site must have been firmly established. After the destruction of the city place-names like the Mount of Olives and Siloam persisted. The memory of Golgotha would have been preserved by the people who lived in the neighbourhood. There is no reason to doubt the traditional site of the Holy Sepulchre.

The book is one of the strongest arguments for the trustworthiness of tradition which has ever appeared; its impressiveness is doubled by the fact that its author is a scientific German theologian who cannot be accused of uncritical conservatism. If to a scholar who has spent much of his life in Palestine the Gospel story appears trustworthy, we can afford to disregard the doubts of merely literary critics.

A few of the many precious things in the book may be catalogued. The stopping of the Jordan for ten hours in 1266 is given in all the books. In October, 1914, a landslip held up the waters for twenty-four hours. "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" expresses the disdain of an inhabitant of Cana, a strong place which was once occupied by Josephus with a small force (see *Vita* 16), for its weak and unprotected neighbour. The change of climate from Nazareth to Capernaum is startling. Any mountain-bred man subjected to the "pitiless" heat of Capernaum and district would naturally seek the high ground as often as possible. The yield of corn in the plain of Gennesaret compared with that round Nazareth is reflected in Matt. xiii. 8—some thirtyfold, etc. A fisherman coming in from the deep would be literally naked (see John xxi. 7), for he had to jump out and save the nets from destruction as they dragged over the stones and rocks. The "city set on a hill" to a dweller by the lake could only be Hippos, in the middle of the eastern shore. "The holy mount" of 2 Peter i. 18 shows that the Tabor tradition already existed. The statement of Mark vii. 31, that Jesus left the region of Tyre and Sidon and came to the lake *via* Decapolis, has been doubted by commentators. Dalman accepts it, having travelled this way. He knows the exact spot where Joseph and Mary, having gone a day's journey, found Jesus not in the company (Luke ii. 46). This was at the usual stopping place, a mile and a half south of the border line between Samaria and Judæa, where the pilgrims rested for the night in order to avoid a halt among the unfriendly Samaritans.

W. K. L. CLARKE.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

The following periodicals have reached us in exchange throughout the past year:

Half-yearly: *Bulletin of the John Ryland's Library.*

Quarterly: *The Church Quarterly Review, The Journal of Theological Studies, The Interpreter, The Hibbert Journal, The International Review of Missions; The Anglican Theological Review* (U.S.A.), *Studies* (Ireland), *Recherches de Science Religieuses* (Paris), *Biblica* (Rome), *Gregorianum* (Rome), *Symbola Arctoae* (Christiania).

Bi-monthly: *The Journal of Religion* (Chicago).

Monthly: *The Expositor, The Expository Times, Blackfriars, The Churchman; The American Church Monthly* (U.S.A.); *Revue Théologique* (Louvain); *Revue Apologétique* (Paris); *La Vie et les Arts Liturgiques* (Paris).

The *Anglican Theological Review* for May, 1923, contains a well-written article on Bishop Ken, under the title of "An Anglo-Catholic Saint," which should be read by those interested in the revision of the Calendar.

Symbola Arctoae is handsomely got up and its first number contains articles in German on theological and classical subjects.

Studies is a new Irish quarterly review, representing especially the ideals of learning and literature which inspire the Irish Free State.

Revue Apologétique for January and February, 1923, contains some interesting "Episodes in the History of the Church during the Pontificate of Pius X.," important for the historians of modernism.

One of the main issues discussed at the Cheltenham Conference held last May, whose papers are published in *The Churchman* for July, 1923, is the doctrinal basis of our present Liturgy; and fear is expressed that the proposed revision of it will import into the Prayer Book new and erroneous ideas of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. We think that some would be reassured if they would read a recent Roman article on the subject by a Jesuit, E. Hocedez, in the June number of *Revue Théologique*, entitled "La Sacrifice de la Messe." He says that both realists, who speak of a repeated immolation, and symbolists, who say that the immolation is purely figurative, are wrong; for both assume that our Lord ceased to be the Victim at His Death. On the contrary, N.T. makes it clear that His Victimhood is no less abiding than His Priesthood—*e.g.*, Heb. vii.-ix., Rev. v. 6, 9, 12. There are three decisive moments in a propitiatory sacrifice: (*a*) The immolation, (*b*) the ritual offering, (*c*) the acceptance by God; and these correspond respectively to (*a*) the Cross, (*b*) the institution of the Eucharist at the Last Supper, (*c*) the Resurrection and Ascension. When our Lord instituted the Eucharist, the immolation was still future; when we celebrate it, it is past; but this inversion of the sequence of events does not alter their essential relation, which is one of complete interdependence. Therefore, *il n'y a pas à chercher dans la messe une sorte d'annihilation. . . . Ce que Jésus anticipait, nous le commémorons, mais dans les deux cas le sacrifice réfère à la même immolation du Calvaire.* The immolation is not, and cannot be, repeated. What is repeated in the Mass is the ritual offering or oblation.

In one point M. Hocedez seems to us in error. He speaks as though the consecration alone constituted the offering of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. We believe that Catholic theology as a whole would insist that the offering of the sacrifice involves *two* acts—viz., consecration and communion. That is why the priest's communion is an essential part of every Mass. Evangelicals differ from Anglo-Catholics as to whether the priest's communion alone suffices—a difference which has perhaps more to do with the conception of the Church than with that of the Eucharist.

The International Review of Missions for July, 1923, contains a contribution of great beauty from the Rev. J. C. Winslow, of the diocese of Bombay, entitled: "Not Leaders, but Saints and Servants." He shows how a missionary, if he is true to his calling, has to grow more and more into the experience of the Cross; and he asks that appeals for personal service in the Mission Field should offer no other allurement but this.

We should be glad to send our exchange copies of *La Vie et Les Arts Liturgiques* to any of our readers who would undertake to let us have a short précis (650 words) each half-year of any matter of special interest which they may contain.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The fortnight July 2-15, 1923, may prove to be one of the most eventful in the whole history of *Ecclesia Anglicana*. It will be time later on to discuss the details of Prayer-Book Revision. Suffice it to say here that both the House of Clergy and the House of Laity established one decisive fact—viz., the existence of a spirit at once of charity and of courage, which created a new atmosphere for revision. We should surmise that the House of Laity will finish their work in November, the House of Clergy possibly by next July.

When the Assembly met as a whole in the following week, reforms which have been circulating for years, and indeed for generations, were carried at astonishing speed. The Union of Benefices Measure gives statutory effect to a procedure which has already been in provisional use. That long-lived scandal, the Sale of Advowsons, has now received notice to quit, and (unless Parliament should interfere) will quit within a measurable time. The Clergy Reunion Measure is the first instalment of a system long overdue, and those in future ordained will be required to set by a sum each year sufficient to provide an annual pension of £25 a year at the age of sixty-five. But most thorough and far-reaching of all is the Dilapidations Measure, whereby all owners of parsonage houses will be required (with the help of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners) to put their houses in initial repair, and thereafter to pay to the Central Authority (Queen Anne's Bounty) an annual sum calculated to keep them in repair at every five years' survey. In view of the burden which this measure will throw for the time being on the clergy, we hope that diocesan and parochial councils will begin preparing to help. But it is a fine, bold piece of reform. The greatest gratitude is due to the Archdeacon of Oakham and his collaborators on the Committee, and not least to the laity who have bestowed many hours of work on a matter that necessarily affects them only indirectly.

REVIEWS

ISRAEL AND EGYPT

THE OLDEST LETTERS IN THE WORLD. Mrs. Sydney Bristowe. Pp. 96. George Allen and Unwin. 5s.

THE EXODUS IN THE LIGHT OF ARCHÆOLOGY. J. S. Griffiths. Foreword by the Very Rev. H. Wace, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. Pp. 79. Robert Scott. 3s. 6d.

EGYPTIAN HISTORY AND ART. Mrs. A. A. Quibell. Pp. xii +178. Fifteen Plates. S.P.C.K. 6s.

We are all Egyptologists to-day. For some months we have grown accustomed to finding in our daily papers excellent illustrations of objects found in the tomb of Tutankhamen, and those of us who knew nothing of the subject before have duly held up our hands in amazement at the wonders which the excavator has revealed. Further, we have eagerly devoured any scrap of information—whatever be its source and its reliability—on matters Egyptian, and a book which purports to deal with Egypt is sure to attract some attention. Whether it is worth attention is another question altogether.

Amongst the various remarks and hints which appeared in the public press was the suggestion that the Pharaoh of the Exodus was none other than Tutankhamen. Two of the three books mentioned above are concerned with the date of the escape of Israel from Egypt, though the views which they put forward are widely different. Mrs. Bristowe, accepting the view that the Khabiri of the Tel-el-Amarna letters are identical with the Hebrews, places the Exodus rather earlier than Tutankhamen; Mr. Griffiths aims at maintaining the familiar view that the Pharaoh of the oppression was Rameses II., that the Exodus took place in the reign of his son and successor, Merenptah, and that the date can be exactly ascertained.

Of the two, Mr. Griffiths is incomparably the more attractive writer, and the far more convincing propagandist. It is by no means impossible that the theory advocated by Mrs. Bristowe will one day hold the field, but it is to be feared that her statement of the case, together with other conclusions which she feels it necessary to import into the discussion, will hinder rather than further the general acceptance of her main position. She finds it necessary to aim at some startling conclusions, none of which is in itself an abstract impossibility, but any or all of which would demand a good deal more evidence than she has seen fit to adduce. Indeed, her readers will doubt whether she knows the meaning at all of such words as " therefore "

and "prove." She thinks the revisers of the Old Testament would to-day substitute Tyre for Hazor in Josh. xi. 10, for she holds that Joshua captured both Tyre and Sidon. Amenhotep IV. allowed Israel to conquer Canaan because he had become a good Jew, having learnt from the Hebrews the elements of true religion. Practically all our Egyptian records are misleading fabrications, concocted by the priesthood in order to blind posterity to the real facts, the Tel-el-Amarna tablets alone of secular records being trustworthy. The great Hittite Empire is swept off the page of history—it never existed. Further, though she probably does not realize this, her theory involves the abandonment of the Biblical account of the oppression of Israel—at least, in important details which the modern critical historian generally accepts. Her method of proof is to draw parallels with modern events and conditions, and to find incredible any course of events other than that which she advocates. She really does seem unable to distinguish between a hypothesis and an established fact.

The book has as a frontispiece a really fine copy of the well-known portrait head of Amenhotep IV.

Mr. Griffiths also is a controversialist, and has fallen into the common error of failing to distinguish between literary criticism and historical reconstruction. Like Mrs. Bristowe, he rejects the normal critical position as far as the literary analysis of the Hexateuch is concerned, and it is impossible to avoid the feeling that in this section of his work Mr. Griffiths has not been wholly frank. He may not feel convinced by Dr. Skinner's reply to Dahse and others on the use of the Divine names in the LXX, but he might have taken care to avoid giving the impression—which his language seems likely to do—that adherents of the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis have not taken this point into consideration. And his list of the things a knowledge of which would make acceptance of the critical position impossible (pp. 20-21) is a little misleading, unless the reader knows exactly in what sense Mr. Griffiths' statements are true. Again, when he quotes a scholar who holds such a position as Eerdmans, would it not have been fairer to let the reader understand that, although the scholar quoted does not share Wellhausen's views, his position involves even more serious disintegration of the text ?

This polemic tone is the more to be regretted, inasmuch as Mr. Griffiths' main subject is one on which the literary criticism of the Hexateuch has only the slightest bearing. Evidence of this is to be seen in the fact that he will find a number of his critical opponents at one with him (in the main), in his reconstruction and dating of events. The most important contribution he has to make is his very skilful reference to the

"Israel-stele," of which he certainly makes good use. This, it may be remarked, is a recently discovered inscription of the reign of Merenptah, in which Israel is mentioned. Mr. Griffiths believes that this is the Egyptian account of the defeat of Israel near Hormah, and makes at least one good point as against such a reference as that of Breasted when he urges that Israel as depicted here was not a settled people, and that the stele must refer to a time earlier than the Conquest. But his theory is, nevertheless, very difficult to reconcile with the account in Numbers, though Mr. Griffiths does not seem to feel the difficulty. His main object is to add to the general conclusions of the modern account of the Exodus an exact date, which he finds in 1233-32 B.C.

It is more than a relief, it is a pleasure, to turn from Mrs. Bristowe's unbridled fancy and Mr. Griffiths' somewhat polemic presentation of theory to Mrs. Quibell's delightful statement of fact. As she points out, to a large extent the history of the civilization of Egypt must be traced in her art rather than in her literature. This the authoress of *Egyptian History and Art* does admirably. She has a keen sense of beauty, and all the skill of the trained archæologist. She is equally at home in the museums of Cairo, London, and New York, and has made the best use of her knowledge. It must have been a difficult matter for her to decide rightly on what to insert and what to omit, in view of the mass of material which her specialist knowledge has placed at her disposal. But no reader will quarrel with the final result. She gives exactly the right amount, with exactly the right comment and explanation, to enable the ignorant reader to call up a swift picture of the history of Egypt. Her story is charmingly told, and her judgment is sober, balanced, and restrained. She does not claim to have proved anything, and it is possible that in certain cases others will disagree with suggestions she makes. But this does not in the least detract from the value of the book. Further, the illustrations are good; not only the beautiful plates at the end of the volume, but also those which occur on the pages of the text. This is a book which it is almost impossible to overpraise, and it should be in the hands of everyone who wishes to feel intelligent when work is resumed on the tomb of Tutankhamen.

T. H. Robinson.

NOTICES

THE IDEA OF GOD. By C. A. Beckwith, Illinois Professor of Christian Theology, Chicago Theological Seminary; pp. xiii, 326. Macmillan. 10s. 6d. net.

Although the author has read widely, and collected a considerable amount of useful material, he has failed to reach the high standard of excellence set on this side of the Atlantic by such recent books as Prof. Clement Webb's *God and Personality*, Prof. Pringle-Pattison's *The Idea of God*, and Bishop Gore's *Belief in God*. This treatise is somewhat loosely constructed, and fails to "grip," save in the final sections which state his strongly held personal convictions on religious questions. The author aims at "the enrichment of this the greatest of all ideas" (the idea of God), by restating it in terms of modern thought. Most Christian readers, however (indeed, many who are not Christians), will consider that the idea has been impoverished rather than enriched in the process. The book is especially defective as containing practically no reference to the doctrine of the Incarnation, which is undoubtedly the most important contribution which Christianity has made to the enrichment of the idea of God.

Prof. Beckwith is an extreme advocate of the theory of Immanence, and denies God's Transcendence altogether. "We must avoid," he says, "the assumption that God is independent of the universe, that his life would be complete without it, and that he is in any way separated from it. Apart from the universe, God is inconceivable."

God has no essence, or "substance," or personal "self." He is merely "will"—a "will," however, which is ethically good: "The moral consciousness will not tolerate the notion that sin originates in the will of God." Prof. Beckwith refuses to affirm that this "will" is conscious, or that it possesses knowledge. If it does possess knowledge, then this knowledge is strictly limited, extending only to the recent past and the immediate future. "It is necessary to suppose, neither that in the Ultimate Reality all that is yet to be is present in the form of consciousness, nor indeed that all the past exists in the form of explicit conscious memory." It is enough for us to know that there is in the world "a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." Since this power aims at righteousness, it makes no practical difference to religion whether it is conceived of as conscious or unconscious, personal or impersonal. Personality in the ordinary sense cannot belong to God. "In accordance with this negative view, we have left at one side the common conception of personality, as selfhood, self-consciousness, self-control, and the power to know."

God is subject to evolution, and is entirely dependent upon the universe, to the limits of which He is absolutely confined. He was not perfect originally, and apparently will never become so. He advances towards perfection in and with the universe from which He is inseparable. The question of human immortality seems to the writer unimportant, and is dismissed in a few lines. Some men have "a desire for continued life after death"; but "whether we shall realize this in prolonged individual consciousness, or only 'join the choir invisible,' experience offers us no lighted torch." All prediction on such mysterious subjects is "fairy-tales."

Prof. Beckwith regards logical arguments as possessing little weight, and metaphysical ones none at all, in the sphere of religion. He makes his appeal to psychology and "religious experience," narrowly interpreted. Yet even from the standpoint of psychology something might be said against his conclusions. Love of God is a psychological fact, and surely such love implies a personal object. Again, psychology knows of no "will" which does not belong to some "self" or "person"; hence (if we are true to psychology), God, as being "will," must necessarily be "personal." Finally, the category of causation, whether objectively valid or not, is certainly a psychological fact. The human mind is so constituted as to demand, for every contingent want, not only a cause, but an *adequate* cause—*i.e.*, one at least equal in magnitude and excellence to its effect. Prof. Beckwith attempts to account for the progress of the universe towards perfection by attributing it to a God who is not perfect, but only *perfectible*. In other words, he makes *imperfection* the cause of *perfection*—a psychological as well as a logical contradiction.

CHARLES HARRIS.

CHRISTIANITY AND PSYCHOLOGY. By F. R. Barry. Student Christian Movement. 1923. 5s.

It used to be said of a certain lecturer in the Theological School at Oxford that he was never content unless he was able, in every course of lectures he gave, to cover the whole field of Christian Dogmatics in addition to breaking a little fresh ground of his own. It is not only the title of Mr. Barry's book which reminds us of this professor. "Christianity and Psychology": it is a large order! As a matter of fact, the title is something of a misnomer; the psychology discussed is entirely of the kind associated with those writers whose work is known to the general public: even so, in spite of a vast number of quotations and references, there is only a passing mention of Rivers. No doubt a large number of people will derive their first knowledge of modern psychology from this book; it is, therefore, a matter for regret that the first three chapters—which are designed as a descriptive summary of the chief current psychological doctrines—are rather scrappy and superficial. It is possible, we believe, to summarize these doctrines accurately and succinctly; but we fear we cannot honestly congratulate Mr. Barry on having accomplished it. A summary which devotes only a few lines to the subject of dreams; which gives no account of "free association" and the psycho-analytic technique (on the results of which, after all, the greater part of the Freudian system is based); which simply dismisses Freud's reduction of all human conduct to sexual bases with "This is absurd; the sexual instinct is not more fundamental than any other"; which ignores the vital distinction between Unconscious and Foreconscious; which contains no reference to Rivers's enormously important attempt (in *Instinct and the Unconscious*) to give a biological interpretation of psychological conceptions; and which without any qualification equates the Unconscious with F. W. H. Myers's "subliminal self," can only be described as inadequate and in some important respects misleading. There are moments, indeed, when one wonders whether the author's own acquaintance with the general subject is not somewhat shallow. The bearings of recent psychology on religious faith and practice are obvious and important; but it is very greatly to

be desired that those students who write from the Christian point of view should be thoroughly *au fait* with psychology as well as with Christianity, particularly in regard to those points where the two seem to be in conflict. In his enthusiasm to enlist a new science in the service of the Faith, Mr. Barry is inclined, we think, to under-estimate these points of conflict. The question of determinism is, perhaps, the most important of them; Mr. Barry's *dictum* that "it may be roundly stated that any satisfactory conception of the nature of human personality is impossible except in terms of will" needs to be reinforced by an examination of the actual phenomena on which the doctrine of psychological determinism is based.

We have ventured to criticize this book from a particular point of view. But it would be giving a wholly false impression if we did not add our appreciation of a great—perhaps the greater—part of it. The pages on prayer and suggestion, and on the Christian ideals of "sublimation," are quite admirable; and the author deals faithfully and devastatingly with the entirely unscientific assumption of a certain school of psychologists that to understand something of the mechanism of the religious sentiment is *ipso facto* to eliminate God from the scheme of things. We do not always follow him in the chapter on "Psychology and Theology," but we believe his contention that "psychology (and especially social psychology) will supply us with the data and the vocabulary for a true theology of the Holy Spirit" to be absolutely sound. It is much to be hoped that Mr. Barry will find time, before long, to develop the suggestive hints he throws out in this direction.

CYRIL E. HUDSON.

JESUS CHRIST AND THE SPIRIT OF YOUTH. By F. I. Paradise. Mills and Boon. 8s. 6d.

This is an exceptionally well-written Life of our Lord, based on wide if not deep reading. Whether the author has read Papini we cannot say, but his aim is not unlike that of the great Italian. Probably there are many readers who will be helped to a fuller understanding of the course of Christ's Ministry by this attractive book, though an ordinary Life with its texts and references would repel them. We think Mr. Paradise would have been well advised had he submitted his MS. to a critical friend with a blue pencil. He has probably not realized how intensely many readers will dislike the tone of some passages. To them such references to our Lord as the following will seem in bad taste—His "white-plumed Figure" (p. 16), "Beloved Dreamer of the World of Light" (p. 151), "pastoral Poet"; the promise to St. Peter is called "that rhapsody of mixed metaphors." The author is apparently an American, but the militant republicanism of a passage on p. 197 is, we hope, not typical of his country's religious outlook: "The whole world has conspired to crown and robe and adore Him as an Eastern potentate. Even His own scornful words cannot dissipate the glamour of royalty, and we worship in the language of servility and in the barbaric images of the Apocalypse." A common habit in certain writers is to set up an image, said to be typical of modern religion, and then triumphantly demolish it. So here we learn that Jesus has become "a middle-class hero . . . His purity is so delicate that no filthy thing can touch Him. He has the fastidiousness and the sort of moral aristocracy which distinguishes those who have been protected from evil." Of St. John

tradition has "drawn a portrait of a smooth and beautiful youth reclining on Jesus' bosom, and has left him there." Neither of these judgments represents the author's own mind. Can he not give other Christians credit for common sense equal to his own?

Referring to the Empire Mr. Paradise says on p. 37: "Rome, in its late phase, was savagery organized into a terrible machine that crushed its way throughout the earth." Of the Jewish Sabbath (p. 99): "The horrors of that day cannot be forgotten." These and similar passages suggest that he has little first-hand knowledge of ancient history. The connexion of the title with the book is not very clear, but the purpose would seem to be to present a picture of Christ likely to attract young men and women. But the student at least is generally matter-of-fact and anxious to probe difficulties. Suppose he consults this book to discover what help the writer gives with regard to the Virgin Birth. Will he not be repelled rather than attracted when he finds as the only reference to the subject this masterpiece of vagueness? "Perhaps Luke borrowed from older religions an established symbol of that mysterious mingling of flesh and spirit, of time and eternity" (p. 47).

But we would not end on a note of criticism. Mr. Paradise has written an interesting and often beautiful book, for the larger part of which we are grateful.

W. K. L. Clarke.

The Prelude to the Reformation. By the Rev. R. S. Arrowsmith. Studies in Church History. S.P.C.K. 8s.

This useful little book covers much the same ground as Chapters X. to XVIII. of Capes' *English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, save that it does not deal with the friars or with the condition of the Universities. But it is largely based on material which was not accessible in print when Mr. Capes' book was published (1900), as, for example, Mr. Hamilton Thompson's edition of the *Lincoln Visitations* and Canon Wilson's edition of the *Liber Albus* of Worcester Cathedral. Mr. Arrowsmith has made good use not only of the published episcopal registers, but also of the valuable unpublished register of Bishop Fox of Winchester. He writes with knowledge and judgment on various aspects of English Church life in the later Middle Ages, including the bishops and clergy, the powers and privileges of the Church, the growing tension with Rome, the movement for educational reform and the condition of the monasteries. The clearness of his style will attract the general reader, while his numerous references, particularly to episcopal registers, make his book more useful to the advanced student than many more pretentious books. He speaks in the Preface of the difficulties under which a country parson labours through lack of leisure and scarcity of books; but the work that Stubbs did at Navestock and Creighton at Embleton shows that such difficulties can be surmounted.

Few subjects connected with the ecclesiastical history of the later Middle Ages have aroused more controversy than the condition of monastic houses. Of special interest, therefore, is Mr. Arrowsmith's Chapter VII., which is based on the visitations in the Dioceses of Norwich and Lincoln and on Bishop Redman's visitations of the English Præmonstratensian houses. The importance of the material is obviously great, but its interpretation is no easy matter. How far, for instance, can the evidence of the witnesses be trusted? In 1517 the nuns at Littlemore

complained that the Prioress had punished them for speaking the truth at the last visitation, and that she had hit one of them on the head with her feet and fists. To give the answer *omnia bene* may at times have seemed the path of safety, if not of truth. Again, how far can the visitations be used to throw light on the condition of monasteries generally? Only with strict limitations. The visitations deal with the faults and not with the virtues of religious houses; hence the internal life of a good house is not described. Again, we cannot fairly argue that, because Bardney and Wymondham and Peterborough and Norwich were at a low ebb in the fifteenth century, other great Benedictine houses, for which we have no evidence, were necessarily unsatisfactory. Certainly when Bishop Gray visited Bardney in 1432 he found much to blame: maladministration of the abbey property, breach of the rules respecting study, meditation, and silence, unlawful games, gadding about, sitting up late, undesirable visitors, quarrelsomeness, and "disdainful and despiteful words of insolence and reproach." The visitation of 1438 by Bishop Alnwick revealed little sign of improvement, owing mainly to the misdeeds of Brother John Bartone, who drove away the abbey's guests, withheld the monks' wages, spoilt the services "by rushing the psalms and singing out of tune," and, in a word, was "past bearing among the brethren." Such evidence is unfavourable as far as it goes, but it is incomplete. Many houses were altogether exempt from episcopal visitation, others, though not exempt, were not visited for years together, or else all records of their visitations have been lost. Further, the character and condition of the houses were constantly changing, so that a final judgment on any given house must be reserved. But quite apart from the evidence of the visitations it is clear that many causes were at work leading to monastic decline. Some lay in the nature of monasticism itself, which was "except in rare cases, unsuitable for the young and vigorous who craved for a more active, a more useful and a more natural life." Growth of wealth and worldly power led to a gradual loss of religious enthusiasm. After the Black Death less care was taken about the fitness of novices, and a lower type of monk was the result. The lawlessness of the fifteenth century infected even religious houses. Brother Ralph Carnelle of Dorchester had a way of falling into rages and brandishing a long knife in the faces of his fellow-canons. Worse still was the financial depression arising from a variety of causes: heavy expenses of upkeep, heavy taxation, burdensome hospitality, bad harvests, fires, floods. Those houses that tried to mend their fortunes by the sale of corrodies only made matters worse. The nuns of Langeley must have rued the bargain they made with a boarder, Lady Audely, who had "a great abundance of dogs"; twelve followed her to church and terrified the nuns by their uproar.

A useful summary of recent work on schools in mediæval England is to be found in Chapter VI. The view that the monk of the later Middle Ages had a zeal for education will die hard, but Mr. Arrowsmith has done his best to kill it by such statements as the following: "Out of an endowment of some £1,200 a year the Abbey (*sc.* Sherborne) spent in 1535 just £5 2s. 8d. on education in exhibition of three scholars at the Grammar School of Sherborne." In the concluding chapter he points out that Christianity has rarely been at a lower ebb than during the latter half of the fifteenth century; it was the failure of the Church to reform practical abuses that led to the Reformation. "Institutions which are in need of

reform must (like minorities) expect to suffer; but they would be wise to reform themselves from within; or they will certainly be violently revolutionized from without."

CAROLINE A. J. SKEEL.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF SIN AND ORIGINAL SIN, IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE. By E. J. Bicknell, M.A. 6s. net.

As the Pringle-Stuart Lectures delivered at Keble College by the Vice-Principal of Cuddesdon, Mr. Bicknell's book speaks with no little authority, and the attitude of the lecturer is hopefully significant of the Anglo-Catholic desire to strip traditional formulas of the unessential in the light of modern knowledge.

There is no doubt that few Churchpeople set an intelligible meaning upon the doctrine of original sin, and that Calvinistic misinterpretations of Pauline phraseology have tended to present it to the modern mind either as a mystery of faith or as a real stumbling-block to the would-be believer. Dr. Tennant's yeoman service in clearing the minds of his generation is abundantly recognized by Mr. Bicknell, and his position vindicated against misrepresentation. "He has no desire to minimize or deny sin, but he wishes to limit the term to the voluntary conduct of individuals and the moral condition that results from it." Mr. Bicknell thinks that this limiting of the word to "actual" sin would obscure vital truths, and criticizes Tennant's view firstly as not sufficiently stressing the relation of sin to God; and, secondly, as too individualistic. It implies, indeed, a state of moral disorder which needs a Saviour, almost as much as the state of the wilful guilty sinner. It is again, and biology here seems to go against Tennant, "inherited through our social environment."

The treatment of such branches of the subject as are affected by the theories of modern psychology, especially the views of Freud and Jung, is open-minded, keen to recognize where traditional teaching is confirmed, and quick to discover the weak points in over-confident pseudo-scientific assertions. It is in harmony with what we may call the rising school of Christian psychologists, which includes men like Thouless and Barry. "The new psychology only conflicts with the doctrine of sin, when it lays such exclusive stress on the unconscious or emotional side of man's nature as practically to deny him any power of reason or conscious choice at all."

Such a statement is typical of these lectures, which, though in some matters open to criticism, are a most encouraging evidence of the rational way in which difficult subjects long obscured by prejudice, for which the modern world is crying for an interpretation, are being tackled in our theological colleges.

W. J. FERRAR.

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS. A Systematic Survey. By Alban G. Widgery, M.A. London. Williams and Norgate. 1923. 12s. 6d. net.

Mr. Widgery tells us that this volume contains the substance of lectures given in Baroda in 1915, and entirely recast and elaborated for a course of lectures before the University of Mysore in 1921. He admits that for many reasons he would have preferred to delay the publication of the book in order that it might be improved by further study and revision. We agree.

On the subject of the comparative study of religions, Mr. Widgery

criticizes the earlier works on the "science of religion" because they were devoted too much to primitive religion or too frequently left out Christianity as though something in essence utterly different from other religions and because of their advocacy of views *about* religion rather than a presentation of the facts in a systematic impartial way. Again we agree. In the work before us an attempt is made, not altogether without a measure of success, to remedy these defects. The chapter, *e.g.*, on "Sin and Suffering: Salvation and Redemption," covers a very wide field, including, besides other religions, Judaism, Christianity, and the teaching of Mahommed. In accordance with his purpose not to state and discuss theories about religion or the different constituents of the religions, but to describe some of the chief facts of the religions, and these, so far as possible, in the language (translated) of the sacred scriptures, liturgies, and formularies of the religions themselves, we are given much empirical data, impartially presented. The survey at the end of the chapter, dealing with the development of the ideas of salvation, etc., leads us to look forward with some hope to a future volume which our author suggests may be devoted to the discussion of the significance and the relation of the facts derived from the comparative study of religions and the relations of these facts to the various theories which have been propounded with regard to religion. If Mr. Widgery has anything fresh to say on the subject of comparative religions, we must wait for this future volume to find out what it is.

H. M. Relton.

The Unveiling of the Fall. By C. W. Formby, M.A. London. Williams and Norgate. Pp. xxiii+187. 10s. 6d. net.

There is no greater obstacle to a belief in a God of righteousness and love than the apparent existence of evil both in nature and man independently of acts of individual human sin. The mysteriousness of the problem drove Origen, and in later days Dr. Julius Müller, the author of the last big treatise on sin, and quite recently Canon Peter Green, to seek an explanation in a "fall" of some kind prior in time to the present order of existence. The same solution is put forward by Mr. Formby. His book shows thought. His spiritual values are sound. He is alive to the shallowness of semi-naturalistic explanations. He faces the seeming waste and cruelty of nature and the slowness of man's moral advance. He is, however, more successful in pointing out the difficulties of other proposed solutions than in expounding and defending his own. All who are not hampered by the dogma that human experience is a closed system of uniformities must admit that the facts may compel us to postulate some supernatural disturbance to account for the disorder of human life. That is not in itself an unreasonable hypothesis, and deserves consideration. But Mr. Formby has hardly chosen the best way to commend his solution. Few modern scholars would take seriously the suggestion that a story in Genesis contains a revealed allegory of a pre-organic fall. The passages quoted from St. Paul are consistent with the view that they are brought in to prove, but are far from proving that St. Paul ever held it. He is also uncritical in dealing with modern spiritualism. Nor, again, is it quite clear what form his own view assumes. He argues for a "pre-organic" fall, in virtue of which the whole vital impulse has become tainted. But who fell? Was it ourselves in a pre-existent state? Or the race as a whole, since Origen is criticized for being too individualistic? To speak of the fall of an impersonal life-

force is an absurdity. If I myself shared in a racial fall, then we are up against all the objections against pre-existence brought, *e.g.*, by Locke, of which Mr. Formby seems unconscious. His theory is attractive only so long as it is left vague. He would have done well to consider the alternative view, approved, for instance, by Professor Clement Webb, that the world-process has been depraved by the activity of evil wills other than human, before the emergence of man on the earth.

E. J. Bicknell.

BOOK NOTES

The Congress Books, 1-52. S.S.P.P. 3d. each.

Mr. Prestige, the editor of the series, has collected an imposing array of writers, and editor and authors combined have achieved a great success. For the most part the books say just what is expected. Originality would be out of place. The influence of the Liberal element in Anglo-Catholicism is marked. Mr. Bicknell unreservedly accepts critical conclusions as regards the Bible. Canon Lacey supports his theory of the End of the World by Dr. Charles' theory of dislocations in the Apocalypse. Dr. E. O. James' treatment of the Fall is mainly concerned with our ape-like ancestors. The Catholicism of the writers is of a definitely English type. If these papers are any criterion, the movement is not looking Romewards to-day, whatever some may have thought its tendency to be in the past.

We doubt if the books will be of much use in working-class parishes. Most of them are rather far removed from the realities of life as it is lived by the bulk of Englishmen. But if the writers have failed in this direction, others have succeeded no better. Probably living epistles written in the hearts of consecrated men and women are the only form of propaganda that ever will influence the mass of non-literary mankind.

The Catholic Student's "Aids" to the Study of the Bible. Vol. III. Acts, Epistles, and Apocalypse. By Hugh Pope, O.P. Burns, Oates and Washbourne. 7s. 6d.

This excellent book is provided with the usual *imprimaturs*, but also with a Preface by the Archbishop of Birmingham, and a commendatory letter from Cardinal Gasparri, conveying the good wishes o the Supreme Pontiff. Within its limits it is very good, and it can be recommended to others than those of the Roman obedience. Pioneer work on the New Testament cannot be expected from Roman Catholic scholars in present conditions. The precautions rightly taken to guard the slow-moving mass of a world-wide communion against the shock of modern criticism hamper investigators grievously. It is pitiful to see Fr. Pope making out a case for the Pauline authorship of Hebrews which no unfettered scholar would dream of making to-day. He is bound by the decree of the Biblical Commission (dated June 24, 1914), which, though in a subsequent answer it leaves the interpretation of "Pauline" to "the Church's further decision," answers "in the affirmative" to this question:

"Is it the case . . . that the perfect harmony of doctrine and of ideas, the similarity of the exhortations and admonitions, as well as the agreement in the form of expression—nay, even of the very words used in this and the rest of the writings of the Apostle of the Gentiles—an agreement which is noted even by non-Catholics, serve to set forth and confirm the Pauline origin of the said Epistle?"

The poverty of Roman Catholic scholarship is illustrated by the confession that " since the Commentaries of Cornelius à Lapide and Maldonatus no remarkable Catholic work [on Colossians] has appeared " (p. 148).

Nevertheless, Fr. Pope's book is very good and just fills a gap in the library of the average Anglican. It is uniformly sensible and interesting, and the long and admirably chosen passages from the Fathers provide a help to the understanding of the Scriptures not elsewhere procurable in so convenient a form. The preoccupation with the Vulgate is not at first sight an equally helpful feature, but one remembers the Professor who, when asked for the best Commentary on the New Testament, is said to have roared, " The Vulgate, man !"

Jeremiah : The Prophet of Hope. By Dorothea Stephen. Cambridge University Press. 4s. 6d.

Here is a beautiful book—a clear and thoughtful exposition of the rearrangement of Jeremiah's oracles resulting from modern criticism, printed with exquisite skill. But in return for the money the purchaser gets less than eighty pages of actual reading matter, the substance of which is obtainable elsewhere in standard works. Clearly, books which appeal to the few and are the only ones of their kind must be expensive nowadays, but to issue books that should be widely useful in so expensive a form is doubtful policy.

The Christian Hypothesis. By the late Edward Campbell Tainsh, with a Preface by the Rev. Francis G. Belton. Longmans, Green and Co., 1922. 3s. 6d.

Mr. Belton is right in thinking that this posthumous work of the late Mr. Tainsh ought to prove helpful to many seeking those grounds for belief in the Christian Religion which are essential if they are to accept the Christian ideal as their aim in life. The book is characterized by a delicate spiritual touch, and springs from a belief that religion can best be helped, not by reviling human reason, but by summoning it into the regions of holiness and worship.

Some Principles of Church Finance. By H. T. Knight, Vicar of Shortlands, Kent. S.P.C.K., 1923. 1s.

This pamphlet has been issued for the National Assembly, and the Bishop of Rochester has contributed a brief Introduction. Itco ntains four chapters—The Offertory, God's Truth, The Maintenance of the Parochial Clergy, Freewill Offerings. The author says his say simply and clearly, and we hope that what he has written will be widely read, especially by members of Church Councils.

The Fourth Gospel. By Henry Scott Holland. John Murray. 6s.

This is not a new book, but a reissue of the second part of *The Philosophy of Faith and the Fourth Gospel,* published a little while back at 12s. It was felt that the manner of publication was a mistake, and the profound studies of Dr. Holland on St. John were not seriously considered when they appeared in the original volume. At the lower price many will be glad to buy the new book. Dr. Holland does not attempt to sum up a vexed question in a judicious manner. Rather, he plays the advocate in his inimitable fashion. Much that he says could not be said better or more convincingly. Here is wisdom, and here is beauty and love as well as wisdom.

The Gospel of the Infancy: An Examination of the Opening Chapters of St. Matthew and St. Luke. By J. Brown, B.D. Mowbrays. 3s. 6d.

Little books on the Virgin Birth and allied problems appear every two or three years. If all are carefully written, then the latest is best, for the battle-ground is always shifting, though it be ever so slightly. Certainly Mr. Brown's book is very good, and quite up to date as regards recent criticism. It is less learned than Canon Box's book, but within its limits more complete and perhaps more helpful to the ordinary reader.

A Gentleman in Prison: The Story of Tokichi Ishii. Written by himself in Tokyo Prison. S.C.M. 4s. 6d.

Ishii was a notorious murderer and thief, who before his execution found Christ. The narrative is very simple and affecting. The words, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," read in a Japanese New Testament, brought him to the light. The Buddhist prison chaplain comes very well out of the story. The prison officials generally, by their patience and humanity, helped to melt his heart. Curiously enough, the humanity of his treatment during his first imprisonment helped to confirm him in a life of crime. "If this is all the punishment I get," he argued, "I need not fear."

The Adventure into the Unknown. By R. H. Charles, D.D. T. and T. Clark. (The Scholar as Preacher Series.) 7s.

Westminster Abbey to-day is a great religious force. Day by day substantial numbers, each Sunday large crowds, attend the services. Many of the worshippers are unfamiliar with the Prayer Book, and get their first impressions of Anglicanism from the simple but stately Abbey rite. A considerable proportion of the congregation is often drawn from overseas. Since the burial of the Unknown Soldier the attractive power of the Abbey has increased considerably. What manner of spiritual fare does this unique congregation receive from the sermons of the Canons? The present volume is typical of Dr. Charles' Sunday afternoon addresses. Most of them are grave and austere discourses calculated to solemnize and instruct the hearers. In some, however, the preacher's political opinions appear in an unfortunate manner. On p. 49 we read: "One of the first duties of Parliament is to repeal the Trades Disputes Act of 1906." In a sermon on "Wicked Husbandmen" the modern bearers of the title are said to be the Reformed Churches of Germany and the Church of Rome. The neutrality of the Papacy "was the most pitiable spectacle the world has ever witnessed of moral, faithless, and shameless insincerity" (p. 176). Other wicked husbandmen are the striking miners. The Archbishop of Canterbury, after the war, published a collection of his pulpit utterances from 1914 to 1918. Few preachers' war sermons could stand the test of being read now. That the Archbishop never deviated from the highest patriotism and Christian charity is what one would expect. But that so wise and good a man as Dr. Charles fell short of the latter at times helps us to realize what we owe to the Archbishop.

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